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A bstract
This thesis investigates three aspects of trade liberalisation. Chapter Two 
presents a model with business cycle uncertainty, monopolistic competition, 
and productively heterogeneous firms. The results show that greater trade 
liberalisation does not always lead to increased firm-level aggregate produc­
tivity, since weaker firms can export in the face of adverse home shocks. How­
ever, trade liberalisation dampens price-output fluctuations, and is welfare 
improving if countries have trade partners with uncorrelated shocks. This is a 
pro-globalisation result since it implies greater macroeconomic stability. Some 
empirical evidence is presented to support this view.
Chapter Three introduces firm heterogeneity into an Economic Geography 
setting. The results show that even a small difference in the productivity 
distributions between two locations can have a significant impact on capital 
distribution - even as wage-rental rates remain the same across locations - 
if trade is free enough. It provides an alternative perspective to the Lucas 
Paradox. The model also shows why high sunk cost industries will locate in 
less risky locations (North) with greater trade liberalisation, while low sunk 
cost industries go the other way. Trade liberalisation accentuates these effects, 
and leads to a different North-South industrial specialisation.
Chapter Four introduces worker skills heterogeneity into an Economic Ge­
ography setting. Trade liberalisation occurs in two separate waves. Manufac­
turing first agglomerates when goods trade is liberalised. The result shows that 
subsequent services trade liberalisation can lead to a loss in manufacturing (or 
de-industrialisation), changes in specialisation, and stagnation of manufactur­
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ing wages. As a consequence of trade liberalisation, there is inequality both 
within and between nations. The results also show that a relative increase 
in skilled workers may lead to greater (not less) skilled workers’ premium if 
it encourages greater services agglomeration. The model is consistent with 
North-South development patterns.
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1 M ain  In trodu ction
“It has been said that arguing against globalisation is like arguing against 
gravity” - Kofi Anan, United Nations Secretary General, 1997 - 2007. Except 
that we probably know and agree a lot more about gravity than globalisation.
The greater integration of goods and factor markets has been the source 
of keen positive and normative academic debate, and also in terms of theories 
and empirics. Traditional theories suggest that freer trade must be positive for 
countries’ welfare. For almost two hundred years now, David Ricardo’s theory 
of comparative advantage has stood as an undisputed piece of economic logic. 
In the 1930s, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin formalised the idea of comparative 
advantage through relative endowment differences. In these theories, countries 
that open themselves to trade will never lose. For many of the years that 
followed, the positive and normative aspect of analysis almost always favoured 
greater trade openness1.
But the international trade narrative has become much more nuanced since 
the 1980s. Pioneering works that dealt with product differentiation and in­
creasing returns to scale, New Economic Geography, firm-worker heterogene­
ity, industrial organisations and multi-national firms, political economy, dis­
tribution and inequality amongst many others, have provided a wider, deeper, 
and ultimately richer understanding of the process we call globalisation. Re­
searchers have come to understand how some segments of society, or indeed 
even some nations, can lose with greater globalisation. Economic Geography 
models for example, have shown how regions or countries can experience a loss
^ n e  notable early exception was by David M.G. Newbery and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1984), 
where the authors show how pareto inferior trade is possible.
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of industries (becoming the periphery) with greater trade liberalisation. The 
gains of globalisation are also likely to be distributed unevenly. As Professor 
Venables puts it, “Some countries will experience rapid growth, while others 
will be left behind.”
Today, there is no longer a single globalisation narrative - positive or nor­
mative. This may well be more reflective of the rather complicated and multi­
faceted process that it actually is. Rather than one grand unified theory of 
international trade, there are now many different models that shine light into 
different aspects of globalisation. It is in this spirit that this thesis proceeds. 
Although the thesis broadly investigates the effects of trade liberalisation and 
specialisation within and across industries, each chapter is self contained in 
terms of logical flow, equations and notations.
In Chapter Two the thesis attempts to answer an old question: does global­
isation make an economy more or less volatile? The traditional theory suggests 
that greater trade integration makes economies more susceptible to terms of 
trade shocks. However, the chapter considers an economic environment not 
with single good sectors, but one with differentiated goods. With business cy­
cle shocks, this can lead to aggregate price-output fluctuations. The surprising 
result here is that opening to trade may not always increase aggregate produc­
tivity. For example, a weak firm that would otherwise have quit the market in 
the face of an adverse domestic demand shock can continue production if it can 
export to a high demand market. There is nevertheless a pro-globalisation re­
sult. It turns out that even without guaranteeing that aggregate productivity 
will always increase, opening to trade with another country that has uncor­
related business cycle shocks can dampen domestic price-output fluctuations,
14
thereby providing another source of welfare gains2.
In Chapter Three, the thesis asks another keenly debated question: why 
has so little capital moved from the capital-rich North to the capital-scarce 
South? Furthermore, why has the distribution of investment flow to the South 
been so uneven? Instead of using a neoclassical aggregate production function 
as the starting point of the analysis, the paper works with firm heterogene­
ity. A small perturbation of the ex-ante productivity distribution, from which 
each firm takes a productivity draw specific to itself, is enough to result in big 
differences in capital concentration. This is achieved without any wage-rental 
differences between locations and it therefore provides an alternative resolu­
tion to the Lucas Paradox. Trade liberalisation further accentuates the spatial 
unevenness of the distribution of capital. Another surprising result is that if 
one location (South) is somehow riskier, without necessarily being less produc­
tive on average, high sunk-cost industries will move to the less risky North, 
while low sunk-cost industries move the other way as trade is liberalised. This 
leads to both locations specialising in different kinds of industries.
Finally Chapter Four uses an Economic Geography model to analyse the 
evolution of industrial locations and wages through two waves of globalisation. 
Goods trade is liberalised in the first wave of globalisation, while services trade 
is liberalised in the second wave. This is consistent with historical evidence. 
Shipping costs (for goods) have decreased sharply since the last century, while 
the fall in communication costs (which pertains to services) is a more recent 
phenomenon. Using an input-output structure, the model shows how manufac­
2The standard ‘new’ trade model [Paul R. Krugman (1979, 1980)] highlights only the 
welfare gain through the expansion of varieties.
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turing activities can agglomerate in one location during the first globalisation 
wave. The model then shows that services agglomeration can displace manu­
facturing in the second globalisation wave when services trade is liberalised. 
In doing so, the paper touches on the big debate in recent international trade 
literature - how globalisation might lead to the de-industrialisation of some 
developed economies, which in turn leads to blue-collar wage stagnation and 
greater income inequality within nations.
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2 T h e Im pact o f  Trade on A ggregate  P ro d u ctiv ity  
and W elfare w ith  H eterogen eou s F irm s and B u si­
ness C ycle U ncerta in ty
2.1  In tro d u ctio n
Business Cycles and  F irm  H eterogeneity  The business cycle, which 
exerts a profound impact on many facets of the economy, has generally not 
been given much consideration in international trade models. Traditional trade 
theories highlight the gains from trade that arise from country level differences, 
either broadly due to technology (Ricardian) or endowment (Heckscher-Ohlin). 
Since these models describe the long run general equilibrium gains from trade, 
the business cycle is in some sense irrelevant. Perfect competition also renders 
the firm irrelevant in equilibrium trade considerations. On the other hand, 
suppose one introduces business cycle shocks to a ‘new’ trade model [Paul 
R. Krugman (1979, 1980)] with homogenous firms. Since firms are homoge­
neous, the business cycle affects all firms symmetrically and does not therefore 
have any reallocation effects. Any business-cycle driven reallocation of market 
shares can only be adequately described with a model of heterogeneous firms.
This paper therefore asks the following question: how do business cycle 
shocks affect heterogeneous firms? What are the reallocative and welfare im­
plications? How do these shocks affect the production and exporting decisions 
of firms? These questions are interesting and important on several counts.
To begin, trade in the context of firm heterogeneity has received much theo­
retical research attention recently [Marc J. Melitz (2003); Andrew B. Bernard, 
Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott (2007) - henceforth known as BRS;
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Melitz and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano (2005)] motivated by strong empirical 
evidence that points to the existence of persistent productivity differences be­
tween exporters and non-exporters. The key contribution of the firm hetero­
geneity literature is to formally model the reallocation of output and market 
shares between productively heterogeneous firms. Firms below the so-called 
productivity cutoff cease to operate, ceding market shares to more productive 
firms above the cutoff.
Economists are therefore able to formalise yet another source of welfare 
gains through trade liberalisation, which arises by increasing the productivity 
cutoffs and the transfer of market shares to more productive firms. But since 
these models set out to formalise the long-run equilibrium effects of trade 
liberalisation, the business cycle is mostly ignored. The notable exception is by 
Fabio Ghironi and Melitz (2004), which microfounds the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect through heterogeneous firms and productivity shocks. However, the 
authors consider only the exporting decisions of firms but not their production 
decisions.
With heterogeneous firms, it is also evident that business cycle shocks 
will affect different firms differently, even in autarky. There are potentially 
interesting reallocative effects of output and market shares. The macro con­
sequence of the business cycle in an environment with heterogeneous firms is 
non-trivial since a firm’s continued production through an adverse demand 
shock would depend on its productivity. The set of firms that quit production 
in the face of adverse demand is therefore not a random selection, and there ex­
ists a systematic relationship between productivity cutoffs and business cycle
18
shocks3.
Trade between economies with asymmetric shocks would therefore present 
another point of interest: how would heterogeneous firms behave and what 
would be the macroeconomic welfare consequences? The objective of this 
paper is to model the effect of business cycles and trade in an analytically 
tractable manner.
M odel O utline The starting point of the paper is the introduction of 
productivity shocks into a Melitz type model. By altering the size of the 
market, these business cycle productivity shocks then translate into demand 
shocks for firms. This paper does not consider any nominal rigidities that 
affect firms’ ability to adjust. However, firms have to invest in fixed assets 
first (due to production lags) before production takes place. The effect of 
this is that firms face an uncertain demand since they are investing before 
the shocks are realised4. Due to the heterogeneity in production costs, profit 
outcomes are no longer symmetric. For example, with a negative aggregate 
shock, weaker firms will make losses while stronger ones will still make profits. 
With a positive shock, all firms will make profits but again profits will be 
higher for more productive firms. Though aggregate profits shift up or down
3 On the other hand, business cycle shocks with homogeneous monopolistically competitive 
firms do not yield much meaningful analysis. For example, suppose a Krugman type firm 
has to decide on market entry by making a fixed asset investment without knowing the level 
of demand entry under uncertainty will occur until ex-ante profit becomes zero for all firms. 
If demand turns out to be high, there will be insufficient entry and all firms will make a 
profit. Conversely, there will be too many entry firms if demand is low and all firms will be 
unable to recover fixed costs and thereby make losses. Depending on the realisation of the 
aggregate demand shock, either all firms make profits or all firms make losses since firms are 
homogenous. The equilibrium does not provide any richness in describing the reallocation 
effect that would occur with heterogeneous firms.
4 In Ghironi and Melitz (2004), the aggregate shock in that model is introduced via firms’ 
uncertainty over their future productivity. As there are no fixed production cost, production 
decisions are not affected by shocks - only exporting decisions are affected. The departure 
in this paper is the presence of fixed production cost, which then affects a firm’s decision 
whether to continue through adverse shocks.
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depending on the ex-post demand shocks, there is always a ‘profit ranking’ 
where a more productive firm always has a higher profit.
Furthermore, in a general equilibrium, productivity shocks also change the 
available aggregate resources in the market place. As Melitz (2003) notes, 
“ . . all the effects of trade on the distribution of firms are channelled
through a second mechanism operating through the domestic factor market 
where firms compete for a common resource.” The first mechanism - namely 
product market competition - is “not operative . . . due to CES preferences: 
the price elasticity of demand for any variety does not respond to changes in 
the number or prices of competing varieties.”5
A similar mechanism of factor competition is at work in this paper. When 
faced with a negative aggregate shock, the aggregate savings (of consumers) 
fall. Since aggregate savings equal the gross investments into firms’ fixed costs, 
fewer firms are able to invest and continue production. The upshot of this is 
that weaker firms will have to quit the market, fitting the stylised fact that 
recessions have a greater impact on weaker firms. In this paper however, an 
additional mechanism is introduced via demand uncertainty: Firms have to 
invest in fixed asset before demand is realised. The expected market size 
(in the next period) will change a firm’s decision whether to continue in the 
market.
Trade and C apital M arket In teg ra tion  Away from autarky, two 
processes of integration occur. The first is capital market integration that
5 Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) provide a model with quasi-linear preferences with firm 
heterogeneity that delivers reallocation of market shares through competition in the goods 
market. However in that model, any changes to income affect only the consumption of the 
competitive sector and have no impact on the monopolistic sector. The model is therefore 
less suitable in the context of modelling demand shocks to the monopolistic sector.
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allows capital to be shipped between countries. The second is goods market 
integration that allows consumption goods to be shipped. As this paper is fo­
cused on the effects of goods trade only, capital market integration is assumed 
to be as simple as possible. There is a perfectly competitive international mar­
ket for capital to be shipped between countries and returns to capital costlessly 
remitted back to capital owners for consumption. This is the key assumption 
of the ‘Footloose Capital’ class of models in Economic Geography. While this 
may not necessarily be a robust or realistic assumption, it nevertheless allows 
the paper to abstract from any capital market complications that might arise 
and focus on the goods market instead.
It turns out that in equilibrium, even the perfect mobility of capital cannot 
replicate the outcome of free goods trade6. Why might this be so? The pres­
ence of trade costs alter the perceived expected market size faced by monop­
olistically competitive firms. In the presence of trade costs, the productivity 
cutoffs of two countries cannot be equalised in some circumstances, leading 
to different selection effects in both countries. The fact that two economies 
have different productivity cutoffs is not trivial. First, it implies that capital 
is not optimally invested as some less efficient firms (in the country with lower 
productivity cutoff) can continue production when they otherwise cannot with 
free trade. Secondly, it implies that the reallocative effect is not maximised 
since some weaker firms continue producing behind trade barriers. In the 
presence of trade costs, market shares are therefore not allocated in the most 
efficient manner across economies.
6 This is a different result from Robert Mundell (1957) that shows that free trade in factors 
is equivalent to free trade in goods in a neoclassical setting.
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What then are the benefits of free trade? As firms in each country operate 
in a larger fully integrated market, the productivity cutoffs in both countries 
are completely equalised (but may still change with different demand states). 
This represents the optimum deployment of capital and allocation of market 
shares between heterogeneous firms and across economies. More significantly, 
this leads to a diversification effect which in equilibrium reduces price-output 
fluctuations faced by each economy in autarky. This result stems from the fact 
that only free trade equalises the productivity cutoffs between countries, and 
allows for an equally productive set of producers to operate. The increased 
macroeconomic stability presents yet another source of welfare gains for the 
risk-averse consumer.
L im itations In this paper, business cycle shocks are introduced by way 
of a two-state (good or bad) Markov process. While this is more limiting 
compared to where productivity shocks (innovations) are normally distrib­
uted with mean zero [see Ghironi and Melitz (2004)]7, the Markov process 
allows the paper to solve various variables in a stationary equilibrium. When 
analysing the effects of international trade, this paper considers only a two- 
country setting to highlight the diversification effect clearly. Nevertheless, the 
insights can be extended to a multi-country setup. Finally, to derive analyti­
cal solutions explicitly, the paper assumes the productivity distributions to be 
Pareto [Ghironi and Melitz (2004); BRS (2007)].
7For example, it will not be possible to generate variable moments to fit the data, greatly 
reducing the testable implications on parameters.
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2 .2  T h e  M o d e l S e tu p
2.2.1 Endowm ents
There are L  identical consumers (who are also workers) in the economy. The 
consumers have infinite fives, and each is endowed with some mean level of 
human capital denoted by H, thereby providing a mean level of effective labour 
force of LH.
2.2.2 S tates o f the World
There are two possible states of the world, bad and good, denoted by subscript 
S  = B  or G. There is high Hq in the good state and low Hb in the bad state. 
This is the characterisation of the aggregate shock. The transition from period 
to period is given by a simple Markov process
Pr(J?Git+x | H a ,t) =  Pr(#B,t+i I H s , t )  =  P
where 1 > P > \  reflects the persistence of the shocks. To abstract from 
growth dynamics, the model assumes the shocks to be symmetric around the 
mean level
HG = (\ + i)H  HB = { l - l ) H
where 7  < 1 is the size of the shock. Naturally, the average size of this 
economy over many periods will be L H8. Workers sell their labour services to 
the market inelastically.
8There is no long-run growth, and the model abstracts from growth effects considered in 
Richard E. Baldwin and Frederic Robert-Nicoud (2006).
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2.2.3 Preferences
In each period t, the j  consumer’s utility is given by
r  r  < t — i
ujt =  Xq~ Xi where x\ = I cita di
-J Clt
and a > 1. Good xo is the homogenous good, produced competitively with 
unit labour, costlessly traded, and used as the numeraire (Po — 1)* Good x\ 
is the differentiated good, where Q,t is the set of varieties available to the con­
sumers at discrete period t. Furthermore, each consumer’s discounted lifetime 
utility is given by
oo
Uj=J2 ft In ujt
t=o
where (3 < 1 is the subjective discount factor in each period.
This preference specification thus exhibits the ‘double-diminishing’ prop­
erty. There is diminishing marginal utility to the consumption of each variety 
in any time period and also diminishing marginal utility to the number of 
varieties in each period. The log utility also implies that the consumers are 
strictly risk-averse, preferring a stable level of utility (or varieties) over time. 
This will be the key property that gives rise to welfare gains when countries 
trade since aggregate price (or output) stability is welfare enhancing.
2.2.4 Technology and Firm s
The homogeneous good is competitively produced. Even after the opening of 
economies to trade, this paper assumes that the homogeneous good will be 
produced everywhere (incomplete specialisation), thereby pinning down the 
price of homogeneous good and wages everywhere to w = Pq = 1 [see Elhanan
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Helpman, Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple (2004)].
For the differentiated industry, there is an exogenous mass M  of existing 
firms with heterogeneous productivity characterised with a productivity dis­
tribution that has a cumulative distribution G(<p) and density function g(<p). 
Each atomistic firm has a constant productivity ip specific to itself on this 
distribution9.
In every period, each firm has a per period fixed cost / .  The key require­
ment is that /  has to be in place one period before production takes place due 
to production lags. If a firm does not invest in /  during this period, it will not 
be able to produce in the period after that. After the fixed cost is incurred, 
a firm can begin production in the next period with the production function 
given as
where I is the labour requirement to produce q units of output.
2.2.5 Capital G oods
Consumers save by investing in a perfectly competitive mutual fund, which 
then supplies /  to the firms in return for next period’s operating profits as 
dividends to the fund. The fund then channels the dividends back to the 
consumers. This approach is seen in Ghironi and Melitz (2004) and it greatly 
simplifies the saving-investment process of consumers. With heterogeneous 
firms, each existing firm will have a different firm value. Considering the 
investment into a mutual fund this way allows one to ignore the investment
9 The minimum support of the pareto distribution is given as (p, while the shape is given 
by parameter k.
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choices of individual consumers. This simplification means that the consumers 
effectively own the entire portfolio of heterogeneous firms through the mutual 
fund (in equal shares), and receive the same stream of dividend. In this way, 
one can also characterise the economy with a representative consumer who 
owns all the firms in the economy.
As countries move away from autarky, this paper makes a departure from 
Ghironi and Melitz (2004), which assumes that consumers in each country 
invest in a mutual fund that owns only the portfolio of domestic firms. Here, 
the paper allows a country’s savings to be invested into the fixed cost of firms 
in another country, and the operating profits to be costlessly remitted back to 
owners for consumption. This is in a sense the assumption of perfect capital 
mobility widely used in Footloose Capital models in New Economic Geography.
2 .3  E q u ilibr iu m  in  A u ta r k y
As the paper deals with a Markov type uncertainty with only two states, 
the equilibrium is in fact stationary - the economy switches between good or 
bad state equilibrium instantly once the shocks are realised, and there are no 
further transitional dynamics.
2.3.1 Consum er’s Problem
Since all consumers are identical, one can deal with the model with a repre­
sentative consumer (normalising L to 1). The consumer faces a decision on 
how much to spend (and save) in each period given the state of the world and 
how much to spend on each good. In each period, the consumer simply solves
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the following Bellman equation with value function x
Xt(vt,H t) = m ax ing  + Pxt+i(u t+uHt+i\St)
subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint
E I St =  Ht +  LJt ~ Et
The representative consumer holds the entire market portfolio of shares of all 
firms. The first source of income is wage income Ht. The second is the net 
revenue of firms ujt returned to the consumer as a dividend. His expenditure 
is Et and he saves by again investing in the market portfolio of firms with an 
expected return ujt+1, suitably discounted by interest rate it.
The optimisation of the Bellman equation with the log utility and Markov 
process give the following Euler equations
Eq Eb
1
Eb = P^B pwB + { l ~ p)h (1)
where E q and Eb  are the expenditures of the good and bad states, lq and 
lb are the real interest rates. From equation (1), as expenditure is higher in 
the good state E g > Eb , the real interest rate is also higher in the bad state 
lb > I'G (the real interest rates will be solved explicitly in later sections). This 
is a standard result - a higher real interest rate is necessary in the bad state 
for the consumer to be indifferent between current and future consumption. 
Since there are only two levels of aggregate expenditure, of which a constant A 
is spent on the differentiated sector, there are also only two levels of aggregate
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revenue in the differentiated sector given by
R g =  A E q R b  = A##
Ind irec t U tility  The indirect utility of the consumer in each period can be 
written as
v = X \ l - X ) ^ E 3m
where S  denotes the state. The consumer’s indirect utility depends on two 
factors - his current state-contingent expenditure E g ^  and the aggregate price 
level Pg(t) of the differentiated sector10. However, since the number of firms 
that are producing in period t is determined in period t —1 given the production 
lag, the CES aggregate price level Ps(t) in fact depends on the investment 
decisions in the previous period. For example, if today is a good state while the 
previous state is bad, the indirect utility is in fact given as Vg = — ~ i
where Pg < Pb • Though today’s income is high, welfare is lower due to the 
higher CES aggregate price. Vq therefore gives the highest indirect utility 
and Vg the lowest.
2.3.2 P rofit C onditions
The productivity cutoff is defined as a productivity level <p* that allows a firm 
to break even in expectation with the investment into fixed cost. A firm with 
this cutoff productivity level is labelled as the marginal firm. Any firm with 
a productivity level below this cutoff will not invest in fixed assets and not 
produce in the next period [see Melitz (2003); BRS (2007)].
10The price of the homogenous good is normalised to 1, and therefore does not appear in 
the indirect utility equation.
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Proposition  1 There exists a ‘Profit Condition’ for the good state PCq that 
provides the relationship between the expected profitability of a firm and its 
productivity <p, when the economy is hit with a positive shock.
Proof. In equilibrium, the marginal firm with productivity <p* will have ex­
pected revenue re(tp*) that recovers investment cost with interest in expecta­
tion only. This can be written as
p& h)1-'’
Ptl—a
r
re(<P*) = —^ i~ — [pRo +  (1 -  p)Rb \ = <7LGf  (3)
G
where p ^ q)1 a is the CES optimal price, and [pRc +  (1 — p)Rb ]
• G
is the expected aggregate market size in the next period given the Markov 
process. Because of the CES function, the ratio of (expected) revenues be­
tween two firms with productivity ip and ip* is given as =  ( j ^ )
This allows the expected revenue of any firm with productivity <p to be ex-
CT — 1
pressed as re(p) = 'r’e(lP*)- The expected profit becomes rc(p) =
& (<^0 (TlG f ~ LGf • This is simplified to be a function of the productivity
cutoff only
7TG(<p) =
v Cr— 1 
v '  - 1  
v '  ' t a f  (4)
P roposition  2 There exists a bad state Profit Condition PC s that provides 
the relationship between the expected profitability of a firm and its productivity 
(p, when the economy is hit with a negative shock.
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Proof. From the previous proposition, the marginal firm condition becomes
The expected profit, characterised by PCb , can be written as the function of 
the marginal firm with productivity (p* only. As the real interest rate is now 
lb, PCb  can be written as
Since lb > lg> the cost of capital is higher in the bad state, shifting the profit
subsections. ■
2.3.3 T he Im pact of U ncerta in ty  and Shocks
Before the paper proceeds to provide the analytical solution to the equilibrium, 
it is useful to highlight several key facts of this equilibrium. Four realisations of 
ex-post profits can occur even though there are only two levels of average pro­
ductivity (since there are only two cutoffs <p*G and <£#)> because firms have to 
make investment decisions before the shocks are realised. Actual profitability 
is therefore not only a function of productivity but is also affected by ex-post 
demand. Measuring productivity using ex-post realisations of profit can there­
fore be misleading. Because of the lag structure, high profits can be due to a 
positive demand shock without any change in the underlying productivity of 
firms.
Secondly, firm level aggregates are now affected by the relevant state. In
r e (<P*) =  iPR B  +  (X “  P )1^ ]  =  o l B fPRB
(5)
(6)
function downwards. The real interest rates will be solved explicitly in later
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the good state, firms with productivity levels higher than <pQ will invest /  to 
produce in the next period. With a negative shock, the cutoff level increases 
to ip*B as market conditions go from easy to tough. The result is that firms 
between G(ipB) and G(<Pq) will have negative expected profits if they choose 
to stay in the market.
Since the parameters are constant, the model in fact has stationary equi­
librium properties. The equilibrium shifts to the good state or the bad state 
without any further dynamics. This allows the relationship between the num­
bers of firms to be written as
Mb  = i - c W Ma  (7)
.1 -G ( -p ’a )
[
j  Q(m* 1"
not invest in /  and quit the market. The business cycle therefore introduces a 
selection effect where only a stronger and smaller subset of firms is productive 
enough to continue investing through the bad state. The final point to make 
here is that firms below <pQ will never invest since they can never recover the 
fixed cost.
2.3.4 Aggregate R esource Constraints
The aggregate resource constraint for the good state can be written as
ff(l + 7) + —  = E a  + M Gf  (8)o
The terms on the left hand side are total wage income H( 1 +  7 ) where 7  is the 
size of the aggregate shock, and dividend which is the operating profits
31
of firms producing in the current period (they invested /  previously)11. The 
left hand side thus represents total income flow to the representative worker. 
The corresponding expression for the bad state can be written as
This paper has done away with the Melitz exit mechanism by assuming 
a fixed number of firms M  on the distribution G(ip) [see Thomas Chaney 
(2006)]. This allows one to write Mq and M b  explicitly as a function of M  
and the respective cutoffs only
Mg = [1 -  G((ph)]M Mb  =  [1 -  G(<p%)]M (10)
This is consistent with equation (7) provided earlier.
Consider the good state aggregate constraint in equation (8). It can be 
re-written as
H( 1 +  7) +  Eg ( — - )  = MGf
By writing the equation this way, the left hand side of the equation is simply 
the aggregate savings (net of expenditure). By making use of equation (10), 
the mass of firms investing in the good state becomes
[1 -  G(V*a)]M =  g (1 + ^) + g g ( V )  ( n )
11 See Appendix A:2.8.1 for the distribution of revenues and profits across firms. The 
proofs show that aggregate operating profits (which flow back to consumers as dividend) 
are functions of aggregate expenditures only, independent of the number of firms. In other 
words, the distribution of market shares across firms does not affect the aggregate resource 
constraints.
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Similarly, the mass of firms investing in the bad state becomes
[ . - q a i . - * 11- ’ 1 ; * - 1 ' 1
In short, the mass of firms that can carry on investing is a function of the 
net available resource saved in the economy in each period divided by the per 
firm capital requirement. These two equations therefore allow the productivity 
cutoffs to be pinned down once the aggregate expenditure (and hence savings) 
in each state is known. Since aggregate savings are smaller in a bad state, the 
productivity cutoff ip*B must be higher.
2.3.5 Equilibrium  C haracterisation
The equilibrium is a set of variables {<Pq , Vb ’ EG, E b , ^G, lb } that satisfy 
the pair of Euler equations in (1), resource constraints (11) and (12), and the 
marginal firm conditions (3) and (5).
Making use of the two Euler equations in (1), the ratio of expenditures can 
be written as
life- +  (1 ~ P) ifc 
P lh  +  0- -  p)ifc_
Let =  6, where 6 > 1 is the ratio of good to bad state expenditure (6 will 
be solved later). The above equation can be written as
1 _ig_ \p+ (1 ~ p)0'
6 lb _p0 + (1 -  p)_
Eb  _  I'G 
Eg I'B
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This gives the ratio of interest rates as
[B_
l G
V +  (i — pW
mp0 +  ( i  - p ) _
e (13)
which is greater than one.
Dividing equation (5) by (3) gives the following relationship
p(pjpi — a 
B
PiVr)1-*
n l - f f
p R s  +  (1 —  p ) R g
p R c  +  (1 —  p ) R b .
ib_
f'G
This relationship can be simplified in two steps. Firstly, the definition of 
aggregate prices - which is a function of firm mass and average productivity - 
can be substituted into the above equation. Secondly, one can make use of the 
convenient relationship that arise from the pareto distribution - that the ratio 
of average to cutoff productivity is a constant12. This constant is therefore 
cancelled out on the left hand side of the above equation. Together, these 
simplify the relationship to
M g
M b
P +  (1 ~ p ) 0
p 6 +  (1 -  p)_
I'B
LG
By substituting the ratio of interest rates from equation (13), the ratio of firm 
mass can be solved as
M g
M b
= 9 (14)
sWith the pareto distribution, ]•
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Dividing equation (11) by (12) gives
Mg f f ( l + 7) + 0M + 9
Mb ^ ( i _ 7) +  Bb (A ^)
With the left hand side to be exactly 9 from equation (14), one can simplify 
the above relationship and solve for
1 + 7
1 - 7 (15)
as a function of shock parameter 7  only. Therefore, the ratio of expenditures 
^  and ratio of firm mass are exactly the ratio of productivity shocks 9. 
From the bad state Euler equation
e -b = ^ b PEb +{'1 P)Eg
Multiplying across by Eg gives 9 = (3lb [p9 +  (1 — p)}. This allows the real 
interest rate to be solved as a function of parameters only
9
IB =
& ip# + ( 1  -  p)i
(16)
Similarly, the good state interest rate can solved as
lG P\p + ( 1 -  p)0] (17)
With the solution to the interest rates, one can solve for Eq and Eb  by 
plugging lb and lq into the marginal firm equations in equations (5) and (3), 
and then making use of the firm constraint conditions in equations (9) and
(8). These will provide four equations to solve for the remaining endogenous 
variables Eg , Eb , Mg , and Mb - Nevertheless, because of the complexity of 
the equations, this method is algebraically cumbersome.
There is a quicker way to solve for the variables. Suppose that 7  =  0 (no 
shocks). In equilibrium, there will only be one interest rate since lb — lg = j), 
there will only be one level of expenditure E  = Eg = Eb , and one constant 
firm mass M  =  M g = M b - The marginal firm condition from equations (5) 
and (3) collapse to one single equation
1  , ^  1  r
M ^ E = 0 fa
where ip = simply reflects the nice property of the pareto
distribution where the ratio of average to cutoff productivity is a constant. 
Without aggregate shocks, there is also only one aggregate constraint
M f = H  +  E  ' A °<7
By making the substitution of M f  into the previous relationship, one can solve 
for
E  ----------------  (18)
This is the solution to the expenditure level in the absence of shocks (7 =  0). 
Since any shocks are symmetric around the mean level of H, and that 
in equilibrium, the exact level of expenditures in the presence
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of shocks are simply solved as
E q =
aH( 1 +  7 ) 
Xfii) — X +  a E b  =
aH( 1 -  7 ) 
Xfilp — X +  CT (19)
Note that the levels of expenditures depend on parameters only. Firm level 
variables such as productivity average or cutoff productivities, or aggregate 
variables such as interest rates, have no bearing at all on the level of expen­
ditures. Fluctuation in expenditures is purely a result of 7  with no other 
influences. With the solutions to the level of aggregate expenditure, one can 
easily solve for the mass of firms using the aggregate constraints in equations
(9) and (8)
MG = g ( l  +  7) /
Xpip
XP'ip — X +  a Mb  =
H (  1 - 7 )  
/ (20)
A ggregate Prices and  W elfare Im plication The expression of aggregate
price is
a - 1  (ps
where M s is the number of producing firms with state S — G or B, and (ps  is 
the average productivity defined as
Vs
1 poo
Jv*
1
cr— 1
With the pareto distribution, the average productivity becomes a function of 
the cutoff only
Vs =
k
h + 1 — cr
1
(7— 1
VS
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where k is the parameter that characterises the shape of the distribution.
Using the definition of the aggregate prices, the ratio of bad to good CES 
prices is given as
Pb  = ( M g \ ^  <Pg /91n
Pg \M b )  <p*B { ]
Following a bad state (due to the lag structure), there are fewer firms and the 
effect of this is to increase the CES aggregate price. This effect is seen in the 
term °~X which is greater than 1. However, the average productivity
following a bad state rises since only a smaller subset of firms above cp*B sur­
vive. With firm heterogeneity, there are fewer firms but they are of higher
productivity, thereby resulting in an opposite effect on the aggregate price
*
level. This is seen by the ratio ^  which is less than 1. Another way of seeing 
this is to realise that firm heterogeneity softens the effect of underlying shocks 
because the firms that stop investing /  in a bad state are the least productive 
ones.
Despite the opposing effects, there is no ambiguity on the price level with 
the pareto distribution. Using the fact that Mq =  M  and Mb  =
M  from equation (10) given the pareto distribution, the productivity 
cutoffs are explicitly solved as
Substituting these into equation (21), the aggregate price ratio can be solved
as
Pd fc+1— <TtJL =  0 ^ T )  (23) 
Pg
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which is strictly greater than 1 (in other words Pb  > Pg)• Aggregate CES 
prices axe always counter-cyclical. A good state leads to lower prices while 
a bad state leads to higher prices, amplifying the effect of the business cycle 
shocks. The larger the 7  shock, the larger the fluctuation in aggregate prices 
and welfare.
D iagram m atic R epresen tation  Diagrammatically, the equilibrium can be 
illustrated in Figure l 13. The profit conditions here are forward looking. Once 
a firm has invested fixed cost /  in the last period, it will definitely produce in 
the current period because of the CES demands; it does not care about cutoffs. 
However, the firm has to decide whether to quit or to continue investing / .  
The Y-axis therefore represents not realised average profits firms earn but 
expected profits. The X-axis represents the cutoff level of productivity below 
which firms will choose not to invest in /  and quit the market.
Therefore, while there is an exogenous mass of M  heterogeneous firms along 
the entire distribution of G((p), the number of firms that stay in the market 
is endogenous. Not all are sufficiently productive to stay in the market given 
the cost of capital. Since aggregate savings are higher in the good state, there 
will be a larger mass of firms that will invest in /  as compared to the bad 
state M g > Mb - The larger the 7  shock, the greater is the firm mass ratio 9, 
which results in a larger aggregate price fluctuation.
A Simple N um erical Exam ple This subsection provides a simple nu­
merical example to the equilibrium just characterised. The parameters used
13Note that by putting (p in the X-axis raised to the power of cr — 1, the profit conditions 
become straight lines. The level of capital costs becomes the Y-axis intercepts [see Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple (2004)].
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Figure 1: Profit Conditions In Autarky
7r(<p)
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here are not meant to be realistic as the purpose of this exercise is simply to 
demonstrate the equilibrium effects in the presence of shocks. The productiv­
ity distribution G((f) is assumed to be pareto with support at 0.1 and shape 
of k = 4. The rest of the parameters are provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameters for Firms and Business Cycles
Parameter H 0 A P P M /
Value 1000 4 0.5 0.75 0.9 100 1
The equilibrium at two levels of 7  shocks are given in Table 2 .
Table 2: Equilibrium of Business Cycles
7 <Ph <Pb LG I'B Mg Mb Eg Eb Pg Pb
0.05 0.1322 0.1355 1.083 1.138 32.76 29.64 1162.6 1051.8 1.986 2.003
0.10 0.1305 0.1372 1.053 1.164 34.51 28.23 1217.7 996.3 1 Q77 9011 ,
fluctuation of the price level between Pb  and Pg- Note that the aggregate 
prices are counter cyclical - a good state leads to lower prices while a bad state 
leads to higher prices. Given the per period indirect utility in equation (2), the 
counter-cyclical price fluctuations therefore amplify the effect of expenditures 
E q and E b , resulting in welfare loss for the risk-averse consumer.
2 .4  O p en in g  to  T rade
Despite firm heterogeneity softening the impact of fewer firms investing in a 
bad state, there continues to be fluctuation in the aggregate prices caused by 
business cycle shocks. The important welfare question is: can trade integration 
between two economies reduce the fluctuation?
In answering this question, a few simplifying assumptions should be made. 
Firstly, the consumers’ expenditures in both economies continue to be uncor­
related after opening to trade. There is no insurance or risk-sharing between 
consumers of both economies14. The implied assumption here is that the inter­
national capital market exists for firms only, it does not facilitate borrowing 
or lending for consumption smoothing. This assumption greatly simplifies 
the characterisation of the trade equilibrium since it ignores the potential in­
teractions between consumers of two different countries. For the firms, the 
effect of this assumption is that aggregate demands are uncorrelated across 
countries. This is not a wholly realistic assumption, but is nevertheless well 
supported empirically. Indeed, the lack of correlation between consumption of 
countries is just one of the six major puzzles of international macroeconomics
14This could be due to incentives issues such as moral hazard, or costly monitoring and 
high transaction costs. Because of these reasons, income insurance between countries is not 
widely observed. Therefore, the trading of international bonds is ruled out.
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[see Maurice Obstfeld and Kennedy Rogoff (2000)].
Secondly, there is a perfectly competitive international capital market that 
allows savings in one economy to be invested towards fixed cost /  in another, 
and net revenue costless remitted back to capital owners for consumption. 
Consumers (savers) in one economy can invest into and become owners of 
firms in the other economy in return for next period’s profits.
Thirdly, the paper considers only two-country trade for the ease of exposi­
tion and to bring out the analytical results more clearly. Nevertheless, as the 
reader shall see, the insights can be easily extended to multi-country trade.
2.4.1 Two C oun try  M odel
Two economies are identical in every way - labour size L , average productivity 
H , preferences, production technology and productivity distribution. They 
also have the same mass of firms M  on the same productivity distribution 
G(ip). However, both have independent aggregate shocks even after they are 
open to trade.
Proposition  3 With free trade, both economies will always have a common 
productivity cutoff.
Proof. The proof can be made by contradiction. With free trade, every 
firm has complete market access into both markets wherever they are located. 
With free trade, the levels of competitive intensity (characterised by the trade 
weighted CES price aggregates) are also the same in both locations. Therefore, 
a firm has to be indifferent between the two locations. Suppose one location 
(labelled as Home) has a productivity cutoff of <p*H while the other (labelled as
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Foreign) has a cutoff of cp*F such that ip*H 7  ^ ipF, a firm that lies between p*H and 
cpF is above one cutoff (profitable) and below the other cutoff (unprofitable). 
There exists a mass of firms between <p*H and (pF that will not be indifferent 
since they can invest /  in one of the market with positive expected profits. 
This violates the definition of productivity cutoffs (this proposition will be 
given a further formal proof later). ■
2 .5  O p en  E con om y w ith  T rade C o sts
2.5.1 Iceberg Trade C ost
Variable trade costs are introduced as the standard iceberg trading cost of 
r  > 1 for every unit of good shipped across the economies. With only variable 
trade cost, the price of export is simply a mark-up over the price of domestic 
sales p x  = rp.
P roposition  4 In the presence of iceberg trade costs, the productivity cutoffs 
between countries cannot be equalised when they are faced with asymmetric 
shocks.
Proof. The paper first sketch a intuitive proof, with the formal proof provided 
later in the next sub-section. Suppose Home and Foreign economies have 
asymmetric shocks (Home in a bad state and Foreign in a good state with 
no loss of generality) and that cutoffs are equalised p*H =  <p*F. If cutoffs 
are equalised, the mass of firms investing /  is the same in both locations 
given the assumption of a fixed number (or density) of firms along the same 
productivity distribution. If the cutoffs are the same at both locations, the 
aggregate price indices will be equal at both locations whatever the level of
trade costs. Since Home is in a bad state, the expected aggregate expenditure, 
taking into account both domestic and export revenue subjected to trade cost, 
is
{pRs +  (1 -  p)Rg +  <}>{p Rg +  (1 -  p)Rb ]}
This is strictly smaller than the expected aggregate expenditure of the Foreign 
economy
{4>{pR b +  (1 -  p)Rg] +  pR g +  (1 -  p)Rb }
since it is in a good state and 4> < 1 because of trade costs. If ip*H defines 
the firm having zero expected profit if it invests /  at Home, a firm with 
this productivity must have positive expected profits in Foreign given the 
larger expected market size there. This violates the definition of <p*F as the 
productivity cutoff. ■
2.5.2 Equilibrium  C haracterisation  W ith  Iceberg  Cost
This subsection proceeds to characterise the productivity cutoffs in the pres­
ence of iceberg trade cost. The impact of fixed export costs f x  will be briefly 
discussed in Appendix A.
Sym m etric Shocks
Proposition  5 The productivity cutoff, common to both economies, is y>Q 
when they are in the good state; and is (p*B when both economies are in the bad 
state.
Proof. Consider the case when both economies are in the bad state. Whatever 
the level of r , both economies have the expected aggregate revenues since they
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are hit with symmetric shocks. Furthermore, both economies will have low 
aggregate savings, with the same aggregate resource constraint in equation 
(12). Hence, there is no capital flow between the economies. This pins down 
a common productivity cutoff <p*B. The same reasoning applies when both 
economies are in the good state. ■
A sym m etric Shocks The only case where iceberg cost results in different 
cutoffs is when Home and Foreign are hit with asymmetric shocks. In this case, 
aggregate savings in both economies are different and there is the possibility 
of capital flows affecting the productivity cutoffs in each economy.
Without a loss of generality, suppose Home economy has the bad state 
while Foreign has the good state, and that trade cost is positive r  > 1. Given 
Eh  — Eb  and Ep  =  E g15, the trade equilibrium is a set of variables {<£>#, 
<iP*F-> lm } that satisfy the following conditions, where lm is the cost of capital 
faced by the firms in the Home and Foreign economy respectively.
First, the marginal firms with productivities <p*H and <p*F must have zero 
profits in their respective locations. This gives the pair of equations
\p R b  +  (1 -  p )R g ] +  $ — \p R a  +  (1 -  p )R b \ =  l i t o f
F
IpR b +  (1 -  P)R c )  +  \p R c  +  (1 -  p )R b )  =  w f
F
where and p{<fp) — are the optimal prices charged by
the marginal firms, Ph and Pp are the trade weighted CES price aggregates.
15Note that from equation (19), since there is no insurance across consumers in the different 
countries, their levels of expenditures are affected by their domestic shocks only.
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By substituting the expressions for the CES price aggregates and cancelling 
out some terms, the above equations become simplified to
v T 1 \pRb  +  (i -  p)Rg\ v T'<I>\pRg + ( \ - p)Rb } =  t ,  ( u )
^ - ^ I p R b  +  (1 -  p)flc] \p R  g  +  (1 -  p ) R b ] (25)
tM n v f r 1 + M f ^ - 1 M h ^ h 1 + <f>MFv ‘7F~1
Secondly, given the global pool of savings which is the resource constraint, 
the total number of firms is given as
|.-CM)lA.+|.-OW)l M  .  W + l H M V ) . TO -» + M V )
(26)
Together, these provide three conditions to solve for {(p*H, tp*F, lm} given Eq 
and E b - Note that it must be the case that tp*H ^  (fF in equilibrium since 
there is a smaller set of producers for the Home country (which is in a bad 
state)16.
2.5.3 The D iversification Effect w ith  Free Trade
Given the characterisation of the equilibrium with costly trade (positive ice­
berg costs), it is easy to show the equilibrium effects under free trade. With
16Note that even though trade cost is positive, the two economies continue to have a 
common cost of capital lm because capital is completely mobile. That is, the last unit of 
capital /  invested must recover the same expected amount tm / in both economies even 
though they have asymmetric shocks. Therefore, lh =  lf — im in equilibrium even in the 
presence of positive trade cost. The fact that productivity cutoffs are not equalised is due 
to trade cost altering the degree of capital flows between the two economies when they have 
asymmetric shocks.
46
Figure 2: Profit Conditions with Free Trade
k (<p )
L M f
equations (24) and (25), one arrives at the following equality
iP^ - 1 [ pRB +  ( l - p ) R G} | i p ^ - ' r t p R G  +  (1  -  p ) R b ]
Mffipfjf1 +  (j)MH^ pa£ l +  Mpip^r1
_  ^ f ^ ^ I p R b  +  (1 — p ) R g \ V * F ~ l  [p r g  +  (1 — p ) R b \
+ Mf &f~1 Mh ^ h 1 +  4>Mf $ f ~X
With free trade (0 =  1), the aggregate prices - given by the denominators - 
are equal. The expected revenues in brackets also become equal. Together, 
these imply that <p*H =  <p*F even in the presence of asymmetric shocks. A 
Home firm will be a perfect substitute for the foreign firm. In other words, 
free trade will result in a common cutoff <p*M even with asymmetric shocks to 
both economies. This is the formal proof to Proposition 3. The effects of free 
trade can be seen in Figure 2.
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This result can also be inferred from the firm mass equations in (20). These 
give the firm masses in equilibrium with the good and bad state, which is a 
function of 7  shocks and other parameters only. In a fully integrated economy 
with free trade, it simply means that the 7  shocks cancel out. With free trade, 
the firm mass that is common to both economies becomes
FT _  
m m  — y A — A + a (27)
Since there is a common firm mass, there is a common cutoff tp*M [analogous 
to the relationships specified in equation (10)]17.
From equation (23), the ratio of aggregate prices is a function of produc­
tivity cutoffs only. Denoting free trade variables with superscript FT, the 
P FT fc+i-gprice ratios become T = 0fc(£7~1), where PB denotes the aggregate price 
when both economies are faced with a negative shock (analogous definition 
for Pq T)18. With asymmetric shocks, the productivity cutoff becomes (p*M for 
both economies (where (p*B > <p*M > (fG) given free trade. As the 7  shocks are 
cancelled out, the aggregate price level with asymmetric shocks P[jT therefore 
lies between PBT and Pq T.
There are now two sources of gains from trade. Firstly there is an expansion 
of varieties leading to lower aggregate prices and higher welfare. Secondly, 
there is a reduction in the probability that extreme price levels are reached. 
This reduces the variance in the aggregate price level and the fluctuation in real
17In the presence of trade cost, the firm mass is always larger in the country with the 
positive shock since the expected market size is bigger. The economy with the negative 
shock will have a smaller firm mass and higher price aggregate. Without free trade, aggregate 
prices are not equalised with asymmetric shocks. Given that consumers are risk-averse, this 
is welfare-reducing.
18 Note that since both economies are in the same state, the cutoffs are unchanged from 
the autarky counterparts, which are (p*B for the bad state and ip*G for the good state.
48
income, thereby representing a welfare gain from diversification for the risk- 
averse consumer. This is a gain from trade above and beyond the expansion 
of variety effect.
Free trade therefore results in the optimal allocation of market shares for 
there will always be an equally productive subset of firms producing in each 
economy and selling across markets. The result is that productivity cutoffs 
are completely equalised even as countries face asymmetric shocks.
When economies are hit with asymmetric shocks, there is essentially a 
diversification equilibrium. For example, suppose the Home economy is in 
a bad state. Under autarky, the cutoff productivity would have been <pB. 
However, if the trading partner Foreign is in a good state, Home’s cutoff 
productivity falls to (p*M with free trade. In other words, some firms that would 
have quit a domestic negative shock at Home in autarky will now continue to 
produce, as expected profits from exporting more than compensate for the 
expected domestic loss. Aggregate firm-level productivity therefore does not 
always increase with trade.
p F T  f c + l - c r
Finally, there is a subtle implication from the price ratio = 0fc(a-1). 
The parameter k characterises the level of firm heterogeneity. A smaller k 
implies that firms are more heterogenous while a larger k implies that firms 
are more homogenous. A decrease in k would lead to an increase in 
propagating the aggregate price fluctuations. In other words, if firms are more 
heterogeneous, the net effect (after accounting for firm entry and changes 
in aggregate productivity) is greater price fluctuation. This suggests that the 
diversification gains from trade are higher when firms are more heterogeneous.
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2.5.4 W hy Iceberg Trade Cost M atters: C om parison w ith  M elitz 
M odel
In the Melitz model with the absence of fixed export cost, the passage from 
autarky to free trade (by r  falling from infinity to 1) increases welfare through 
the CES price aggregates, with no further impact on firm level variables. The 
reason for this is that a fall in r  increases local competitive intensity through 
the price index but also increases export revenue, leaving the firm exactly 
indifferent.
However, the level r  is crucial here and affects the productivity cutoffs. The 
key here is to realise that Melitz presents a model which is a long run stable 
equilibrium of countries of symmetric sizes, “Firms correctly anticipate this 
stable aggregate environment when making all relevant decisions. The analysis 
then focuses on the long run effects of trade and the relative behaviour and 
performance of firms with different productivity levels.” In that model, both 
consumption demand and investment into firms are constant. The presence 
of iceberg cost therefore does not have any further effect since it preserves the 
homotheticity amongst all firms.
In this paper, even though both economies have a long run average size 
of L H , each of them fluctuates around two states defined by the Markov 
process. The pool of aggregate savings in each economy changes according to 
the shocks, thereby changing the resource available for investment, and in the 
process altering the survivability conditions in different states.
Cross B order C apital Flow Given that aggregate savings are not the same 
when the countries are faced with asymmetric shocks, there will be cross border
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capital flow. Through its effects on expected market potentials, r  changes the 
incentive for cross-border capital flows. A lower r  provides higher incentive for 
the high savings economy (good state) to invest into the low savings economy 
(bad state), until the productivity cutoffs are completely equalised with free 
trade. Conversely, a higher trade cost r  creates a divergence between the 
perceived market sizes when the economies are hit with asymmetric shocks 
and reduces the diversification effect. Trade liberalisation therefore dampens 
differences in productivity cutoffs between two economies when they are hit 
with asymmetric shocks, leading to lower price-output fluctuations.
The key point is this: free capital mobility, in the presence of positive 
trade costs, cannot equalise the productivity cutoffs between two economies 
when they are hit with asymmetric shocks. Therefore, free capital mobility 
alone cannot replicate free trade outcomes. Since productivity cutoffs are 
unequal with asymmetric shocks and positive trade costs, market shares are 
not allocated in the most efficient way between heterogeneous firms across 
the two economies. Only with free trade will there be optimal allocation of 
market shares between productively heterogeneous firms across countries - 
that is, an equally productive subset of producers in each country (above a 
common productivity cutoff of (p*M when there is asymmetric shocks) will stay 
in the market.
2.5.5 Extension to  Output and M ultiple Countries
In the setup of the model, the paper has modelled welfare changes to the con­
sumer through the impact of trade on the CES price aggregates. However, 
there is an simple conceptual extension to output. If one considers the differ­
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entiated sector as an immediate sector supplying a final competitive sector as 
in the Ethier production function [see also Anthony J. Venables (1996)], the 
smaller price fluctuation shown here directly translates into smaller output 
fluctuation of the final sector. Free trade therefore reduces output fluctua­
tion in this interpretation. So long as the consumer is risk-averse, the lower 
fluctuation of price-output will be a source of welfare gain.
Furthermore, if a large number of countries with uncorrelated 7  shocks are 
engaged in free trade, all of them will converge to ip*M, completely stabilising 
aggregate price-output across all economies. Except to note that this result 
is obvious from the Central Limit Theorem, this will not be given any formal 
proof.
2.6  E m p irica l E v id en ce
The key result in this paper is that trade between economies with uncorrelated 
productivity shocks leads to lower price-output fluctuation. This sub-section 
presents a stylized test to the hypothesis: whether there is indeed a (negative) 
correlation between trade diversification - as measured by the spread of trade 
across different trading partners - and output volatility.
2.6.1 M easures o f Trade D iversification
The measure of trade diversification is the equivalent of the Herfindahl index. 
Take exports as an example. For each i country in the sample, the share of 
export to each of the other countries j  in the sample is computed Sij. The
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Export Dispersion Index (EDI) is given as
e d u  = y ,  4
which is the sum of squares of the shares of export. EDI is calculated using 
1995 data. A measure of 1 will mean that the country is exporting all its 
merchandise good to one market - that is, its export is highly concentrated. 
A measure approaching 0 will imply the greatest possible export market di­
versification.
Another two dispersion indices are calculated for each country using year 
1995 data, the Import Dispersion Index (IDI) and Trade Dispersion Index 
(TDI), the last being a trade-weighted average of EDI and IDI. TDI therefore 
fully captures how diversified a country’s trade is, or broadly how integrated 
it is with the rest of the world. The measure of output volatility is taken to 
be the standard deviation of annual GDP growth between 1995 and 2002.
2.6.2 D ataset
The dataset is from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and is compiled 
by the IMF. It provides the merchandise exports and imports reported by each 
country with all trading partners19. There are a total of 115 countries in the 
sample [full sample provided in Table 4 in Appendix A:2.9.3]. This is con­
siderably smaller than the original data coverage for several reasons. Firstly, 
dependencies and territories are generally dropped. Secondly, countries known 
to be afflicted by armed conflicts, either international or civil, during the pe-
19Unfortunately, this dataset does not include services trade and a similar dataset for 
services is not available. The data therefore does not fully capture the extent of trade 
diversification.
riod are also dropped. Thirdly, countries under known UN sanctions are also 
dropped. The motivation for dropping these countries is that their observed 
growth volatility and trade shares are driven by considerations from which the 
model abstracts.
2.6.3 R egression R esults
Cross-section regressions are then performed with growth volatility as the in­
dependent variable, dispersion indices as the dependent variables along with 
other controls20. Five regressions are performed. In regression (1), none of 
the dispersion indices are included. EDI is added to regression (2), IDI to 
regression (3) and TDI to regression (4). Naturally, EDI, IDI and TDI exhibit 
a high degree of correlation, which is why they are used as independent vari­
ables separately rather than altogether. Finally in (5), the regression is run 
using TDI and with log population as the analytical weight. The results are 
presented in Table 3.
Not altogether surprising, ex-Soviet and crisis-affected countries have higher 
growth deviations. The EU and NAFTA dummies show lower growth devi­
ations. The coefficient for GDP size is negative (as expected) for all cases. 
However, it is only significant in regression (1), before the introduction of var­
ious dispersion indices. Furthermore, the constant term in regression (1) is 
high, and highly significant.
Subsequent regressions that include EDI, IDI and TDI all show an im-
20 Some country group are captured by the various dummies: Crisis, Ex-USSR, OPEC, 
EU and NAFTA. Crisis countries are those affected by financial crisis during the sample 
period, and include Thailand, Malaysia, Korea and Argentina. A dummy is also created 
for ex-Soviet bloc countries, which experienced a difficult transition to free markets during 
much of the 1990s.
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Table 3: Regression of Growth Standard Deviations 1995-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(GDP) -0.155* -0.044 -0.065 -0.041 -0.045
(0.076) (0.085) (0.082) (0.084) (0.087)
Goods Trade as % of GDP 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Crisis 3.533** 3.531** 3.395** 3.464** 3.477**
(0.358) (0.350) (0.358) (0.353) (0.350)
Ussrbloc 1.839** 1.797** 1.830** 1.844** 1.895**
(0.570) (0.534) (0.544) (0.539) (0.552)
Opec 0.569 0.296 0.679 0.438 0.419
(0.466) (0.404) (0.446) (0.402) (0.397)
EU -0.758* -0.811* -0.953** -0.943** -0.944**
(0.304) (0.330) (0.315) (0.321) (0.320)
NAFTA 0.448 -1.754+ -1.057 -1.607+ -1.524
(0.807) (1.036) (0.860) (0.962) (0.936)
EDI 4.962**
(1.529)
IDI 4.367*
(1.972)
TDI 5.172** 5.116**
(1.736) (1.727)
Constant 6.115** 2.860 3.488 2.812 2.896
(1.903) (2.184) (2.111) (2.160) (2.242)
Observations 115 114 113 113 113
R-squared 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.43
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
provement of fit, with a reduction in both the size and significance of the 
constant term. Even the GDP term, which has some explanatory power in 
regression (1), becomes insignificant when the trade dispersion indices are 
included. All three trade dispersion indices are significant and improve the 
overall fit. In particular, including TDI results in the best fit and a highly 
significant coefficient.
The results contrast with some existing research. For example, Dani Ro- 
drik (1998) shows that countries that trade more tend to have bigger gov­
ernments. The maintained hypothesis is that greater trade integration has 
resulted in greater economic volatility, and hence necessitating bigger govern­
ments as demand stabilisers. The results here however show that openness 
(measured by trade as a percentage of GDP) does not have explanatory power 
over output volatility. On the other hand, the results show that diversifying 
trade with more trade partners is associated with lower output volatility and 
hence higher welfare. This can therefore be interpreted as a pro-globalisation
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result.
Given that countries are by definition heterogeneous, and that the regres­
sion setup highly parsimonious, the result has to be interpreted with some 
caution. The quality of institutions, for example, will affect both the ability of 
firms to carry out trade with the rest of the world and also the fluctuation of 
growth rates. On the other hand, firms in countries whose domestic demand 
may be more prone to shocks could have more incentives to seek out other 
export markets. The results should therefore be interpreted as a correlation 
between growth volatility and trade diversification (rather than causation). 
Nevertheless, the result provides some evidence that trade diversification is 
indeed correlated with lower aggregate output volatility, and suggests that 
further research into this issue is warranted.
2 .7  C on clu sion
This paper has built on recent trade and firm heterogeneity literature, in par­
ticular the aggregation properties of Melitz (2003) in the presence of firm 
heterogeneity. Real Business Cycles type aggregate productivity shocks, with 
consumers who optimise inter-temporally, are introduced into a setting where 
firms have to invest in fixed assets before the realisation of the shocks. This 
model therefore makes the firm’s problem more realistic compared to tradi­
tional trade models.
Without firm heterogeneity, a negative shock would result in all firms mak­
ing losses, thereby rendering any between-firms analysis meaningless. As it is 
now possible to solve for market and firm level outcomes in the presence of firm 
heterogeneity, it has become meaningful to analyse the reallocative impact of
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such shocks. Different firms will be affected differently while still allowing for 
market aggregates to be solved analytically.
When trade is not totally free, the productivity cutoffs cannot be equalised, 
and some producers are shielded by trade barriers and will continue to have 
positive market shares. With free trade, productivity cutoffs are always equalised 
in both economies in a full diversification outcome - which means that an 
equally productive subset of producers remain in the market. Nevertheless, 
the diversification equilibrium also implies that aggregate firm-level produc­
tivity does not always increase with trade. Weak companies that would have 
quit in a negative demand shock in autarky can continue to operate given 
diversification possibilities.
Despite this, the model offers a comforting result for trade economists by 
identifying another source of trade gains. The key to unlocking the insight 
from the model lies in understanding that opening to trade results in smaller 
fluctuation in the aggregate price levels and may therefore raise the welfare of 
risk-averse consumers.
57
2 .8  A p p en d ix  A
2.8.1 D istribution  o f A ggregate R evenues and Profits
This subsection highlights the distribution of aggregate revenues and profits 
across firms. It will show that aggregate revenues are independent of the 
number of existing firms. The stream of dividend to the consumers, which 
depends on aggregate revenues only, is therefore also unaffected by the number 
of firms. This shows that the good and bad state resource constraints in 
equations (8) and (9) are also independent of firm level considerations.
The consumer is forward looking. Once the current state is realised, his 
adjustment to Eq or Eb is instant, pinning down the current period’s market 
size or aggregate revenue for the industry {Rq or R b )- However, the revenue 
per firm depends on the number who invested /  in the previous period, which 
depends on the last period’s realised state. There could either be Mq or Mb 
firms investing /  previously, who will share revenue this period
R g =  M b R g ,b — M q R g ,G
where R g ,b  denotes the average per firm revenue conditioned on a previously 
bad state (analogous for R g ,g )• Since M g  > M b , the per firm revenue is 
higher when there are fewer competitors R g ,b  >  R g ,G- Similarly for the bad 
state
R b = M b R b ,b = M gRb ,g
where R b ,b  >  R b ,G • Therefore, conditioning out the current state, average 
revenue is always higher when the previous state is bad. Since the ratio of
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average productivity is directly related to the ratio of average productivity (to 
the power of a — 1), this shows that average productivity of firms is higher 
following a bad state.
Rg,g \ V g J R b ,g
This result shows that > <p*G. Conditioned on the current state, average
profit is therefore also higher if the previous state is bad.
P e r firm  profit is higher following a bad  s ta te  To develop this idea
more formally, one can show that
R g ,b =  r P^ M B g ^ =  r  P {^ a— M G g (v > )d ^  =  R g ,g
J tP*B B  J(P*G G
It does not matter what the previous state is, aggregate revenue Rq depends 
on only the current state. Furthermore, operating profit will also be ^  if 
today is a good state. Similarly
R b ,b  =  f ° °  p ( ^ i  ° f B  MBg(<p)d<p =  r  P{,p)' ° f BMGg(v)d<p =  R b ,g
J(P*b  t B  J(P*G G
This establishes the following inequalities
6  R g ,b  ^ R g ,g  ^  ^  R b ,b  ^ R b ,g  _  o  a o \
~ M b  ~ M g  ° ’G  B ’B  R b ’G  ( A 2 )
Since the consumers optimise instantly, R g and R b  are pinned down immedi­
ately. However, the number of firms selling in this period has the lag effect of 
investing /  the previous period. Aggregate revenue is therefore shared among
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the mass of firms determined in the previous period, and the market shares 
allocated as such. However, aggregate revenues are unaffected by the number 
of firms since R g,b  — R g,G (good state) and Rb ,b  — R b ,g (bad state). The 
stream of dividend for consumers in each state is therefore also unaffected by 
the number of firms.
2.8.2 Equilibrium  C haracterisation w ith  Fixed Export Cost
The firm heterogeneity literature is motivated by the empirical evidence that 
only a small and productive subset of firms engage in exporting activities. The 
presence of iceberg trade cost alone does not create this export partitioning, 
due to the CES preferences. In order to achieve export partitioning, a fixed 
export cost f x  has to be introduced. This paper assumes that f x  has exactly 
the same conditions attached to /  - it is funded through aggregate savings and 
has to be invested one period before export can take place.
For exporters to be a small and more productive subset of all firms, there 
must exist firms with productivity below p  that find it profitable to operate 
domestically (with domestic revenue rd ) but not export (thereby foregoing 
revenue rx)- The two inequalities therefore become
<r a a
where rx(p) = t 1 ar£f{p) due to the CES preference. Together, the parti­
tioning condition implies that
/  < r ' - ' f x
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which says that the combination of iceberg cost and fixed export cost must be 
high enough to deter some firms from exporting. Define ip*x  as the marginal 
firm that just breaks even through exporting. The probability that a firm 
is strong enough to export is the conditional probability of a firm having a 
distribution above <p*x . This conditional probability px  is given as
Suppose that both economies are in the same state. Note then that 
rD(v*H) = <nHf  and rx {ip*HX) =  4>rD{p*HX) = <JiHf x • Taking ratios of 
the two gives the following relationship
i  f  P h x }  f x  i f  1 f  f x  \  cr~1 *
which says that the export cutoff <PhX is a function of domestic cutoff p*H 
only. This allows the conditional export probability px  to be determined as a 
function of parameters only.
Suppose Home and Foreign are in a good state. The aggregate resource 
constraint from equation (26) becomes modified as
[ i  -  G ( v y ] M  =  H ( 1 + 7 + -g i V l  { A 3 )
In other words, global aggregate savings have to be used to fund fixed cost /  
as well as the the f x  requirements of exporters. By inspecting equation (A3) 
and comparing it with equation (26), it is clear that the effect of fixed export 
cost will shift cpQ rightwards (higher). The effect of f x  creates another source
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of resource competition. As exporters demand f x ,  there will be fewer firms in 
equilibrium and productivity cutoffs will have to increase. Similar analytical 
reasoning can be applied to when both economies are in a bad state or when 
they have asymmetric shocks. The effect of fixed export cost will always push 
productivity cutoffs higher.
Assuming that export partitioning holds, the conditional probability of 
exporting jpux is strictly less than 1. The effects of trade liberalisation (as 
characterised by a fall in r)  can be seen from the above equation. As r  falls, the 
conditional probability of exporting increases. This increases the denominator 
of equation (A3), leading to an increase in the productivity cutoffs <Pq through 
the competition of resource.
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2.8.3 Country Sample
This is the list of countries.
Table 4: Country Samples
Albania Egypt, Arab Rep. Latvia Slovak Republic
Algeria El Salvador Lebanon Slovenia
Angola Estonia Libya South Africa
Argentina Ethiopia Lithuania Spain
Armenia Finland Luxembourg Sri Lanka
Australia France Macao, China Sudan
Austria Gabon Malaysia Sweden
Azerbaijan Gambia, The Mexico Switzerland
Bahrain Georgia Mongolia Syrian Arab Republic
Bangladesh Germany Morocco Tanzania
Belarus Ghana Mozambique Thailand
Belgium G reece Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago
Bolivia Guatemala New Zealand Tunisia
Brazil Honduras Nicaragua Turkey
Bulgaria Hong Kong, China Nigeria Uganda
Cambodia Hungary Norway Ukraine
Cameroon Iceland Oman United Arab Emirates
C anada India Pakistan United Kingdom
Central African Republic Indonesia Panam a United S tates
Chile Iran, Islamic Rep. Paraguay Uruguay
China Ireland Peru Uzbekistan
Colombia Israel Philippines Venezuela, RB
Costa Rica Italy Poland Vietnam
Cote d’Ivoire Jam aica Portugal Yemen, Rep.
Croatia Japan Romania Zimbabwe
Czech Republic Jordan Russian Federation
Denmark Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia
Dominica Kenya Senegal
Dominican Republic Korea, Rep. Serbia and Montenegro
Ecuador Kuwait Singapore
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3 W h y C apital D o es N o t M igrate to  th e  South: A  
N ew  E conom ic G eography P ersp ective
3.1  In tro d u ctio n
It has long been a source of consternation among economists as to why there 
has been considerably less capital flow from the capital rich industrialised 
economies to the capital poor developing economies. Using a standard neo­
classical growth model, Robert E. Lucas Jr. (1990) shows that the implied 
marginal productivity of capital in India is an astounding 58 times that of 
US. It is therefore a puzzle among economists why traditional theories cannot 
explain the capital flow (or lack thereof) from the developed to the developing 
economies.
There has been much research dedicated to explaining the ‘Lucas Para­
dox’. Some economists have used differences, in fundamentals (production 
structure, technology, policies, institutions) as explanations for the paradox. 
For example, Lucas cites the differences in human capital as the key reason 
why capital does not move to the South. On the other hand, other economists 
have mainly relied on capital market failures (expropriation risks, sovereign 
risks, asymmetric information) to resolve the paradox21.
Even more interestingly, not all economists agree that there is a paradox 
in the first place. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2004) even 
suggest that the real paradox is that there is in fact too much capital flow to 
developing countries, considering the history and incidence of default in these 
economies. Aaron Tornell and Andres Velasco (1992) highlight the theoretical
21 See Alfaro et al (2005) for a brief discussion on the various competing hypotheses.
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possibility that poor property rights may even result in capital flight from 
a capital poor country to a capital rich country with better protection (or 
private access). It is therefore not abnormal that capital stays in the North 
as it offers better property rights. On a separate note, Abhijit Banerjee and 
Esther Duflo (2004) document comprehensive evidence which suggests that 
differences between the rates of return within some economies are larger than 
those across countries, which of course brings us to the question of whether it 
is relevant to focus on the Lucas Paradox.
Nevertheless, it is also clear from empirical research that it is often difficult 
to distinguish one theory from another. Countries with weak institutions tend 
to have lower human capital, and weak institutions tend to be associated with 
greater information asymmetry and expropriation risks. There can be too 
much or too little capital to the South, depending on which benchmark model 
is used, what instruments axe used, what is defined as capital, and what kind 
of growth accounting is used22.
Notwithstanding the various arguments presented, development over the 
past decade has necessitated a new understanding of the Lucas Paradox. The 
opening of China, India and other major emerging economies has resulted in 
increased flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to what is loosely termed 
as the South. The flow of capital is however highly uneven. In a recent 
working paper by Stephany Griffith-Jones and Jonathan Leape (2002), the au­
thors highlight the huge differences in the capital flows to emerging economies. 
China attracted a fifth of all private capital flows to developing countries in
22Francesco Caselli and James Feyrer (2007) offer a similar insight by making a distinction 
between reproducible and non-reproducible capital. The authors argue that the reward to 
reproducible capital is in fact rather low in the South once proper accounting is done. There 
is therefore no paradox that capital does not move there.
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the 1990s, peaking at $60 billion in 1997. India’s share has been paltry by 
contrast, with a peak of $7 billion only in 1994. The latest figures show that 
China took in $72 billion in FDI in 2005, while India only received $6.6 bil­
lion23. Despite recent headline-grabbing growth rates from India, the FDI gap 
with China has not closed, although this might change in the near future.
If the Lucas paradox exists for India, it is on the face of it much less of 
a paradox for China. Is it therefore correct to conclude that China somehow 
has better fundamentals - institutions, technology, human capital, and/or less 
capital market imperfections? Given the fact that India is a stable parlia­
mentary democracy, has a deeply entrenched English legal system with the 
associated emphasis on property rights, and a largely free press, it is difficult 
to turn the argument around and conclude that China has better institutions 
or better functioning markets that result in the huge difference in observed 
investment flows24.
The puzzle is therefore not only why relatively little capital has flowed 
to the developing economies but also the distribution of the flow of capital 
to these economies. The objective of this paper is to synthesize the New
23 China’s cumulative inward FDI stands at $318 billion compared to $45 billion for India 
(UNCTAD). The difference in the levels of FDI is not due to differences in domestic invest­
ment. Inward FDI made up 11.3 per cent of China’s gross capital formation between 1990 
and 2000, but only 1.9 per cent compared to India. One of the explanations for the big 
difference is the effect of ‘round-tripping’ - domestic investment by Chinese firms disguised 
as FDI in order to gain a tax advantage. A look at the foreign investment position from the 
US however recorded the following difference: US cumulative investments in China and India 
(historical price) stand at $16.9B and $8.5B respectively. For manufacturing, the respective 
figures are $8.8B and $2.4B (Bureau of Economic Analysis). While ‘round-tripping’ may 
well account for some of the difference between the FDI that China and India have received, 
it is clear that China continues to receive signficantly more bona fide FDI than India.
24 The problem with looking at historical data for defaults to explain current allocation, 
or predict future capital flows, becomes evident here. Historical data do not account for 
regime changes, changes in investor confidence and perception about the future. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) duly note that India has never defaulted while China has defaulted on 
two occasions between 1901 and 2002. Yet it is still the case that China has taken the lion’s 
share of FDI.
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Economic Geography (NEG) understanding of the location of industries with 
more recent firm-heterogeneity trade models, in order to bring about a new 
understanding to an old puzzle as well as answer some of these new questions 
posed.
NEG researchers have had more than a decade of success in demonstrat­
ing how industrial agglomeration can result. These models demonstrate how 
a symmetric fall in trade costs can result in highly asymmetric outcomes 
(catastrophic agglomeration). The first NEG model, popularly known as the 
Core-Periphery (CP) model, by Paul R. Krugman (1991) demonstrates how 
the migration of industrial workers can result in industry concentration in a 
location. Subsequent work by Anthony J. Venables (1996) shows how vertical 
linkages (VL) between industries can result in firm migration with a similar 
agglomeration effect. These two models exhibit ‘cumulative causation’25. An 
example of the mechanics is that firms locate where there are workers, and 
workers locate where there are firms (to reduce cost of living), giving rise to a 
feedback effect. These models tend to be highly intractable as a result. A more 
tractable model of industrial location is the ‘Footloose Capital’ (FC) model 
due to Philippe Martin and Carol Ann Rogers (1995). The key assumption of 
the model is that only capital is mobile, while workers and owners of capital 
are not. Capital income is costlessly repatriated, consumed locally. Since ex­
penditure shares between the locations remain static regardless of the choice 
of industrial location, there is no agglomerative (or feedback) effect in this
25 Some NEG models exhibit agglomeration - namely a feedback effect that generates ever 
increasing pressure for firms to locate in any one location. Other NEG models exhibit a 
concentration effect, where one observes more firms in one location even though there is no 
feedback effect. Both classes of NEG models explain the spatial locations of firms without 
appealing to technological externalities, which are captured by ‘spillover’ models.
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class of models.
This paper has chosen to adopt the FC assumption. Firstly, international 
economics continue to be dominated by high capital mobility. Though there is 
international migration of labour, the speed at which adjustments take place 
is far slower, and its magnitude much smaller, compared to the movement 
of international capital. CP models with labour mobility might therefore be 
more useful in explaining regional adjustments within national economies than 
across countries. Secondly, the VL models rest on the assumption that firms 
require differentiated inputs or an Ethier type production function - specifi­
cally, all downstream firms using all upstream firms’ inputs. While this offers 
a theoretical benchmark, its stylised assumption that all firms use all inputs 
is not often observed in reality.
In essence, the model in this paper assumes mobile capital, immobile 
labour, and firms with heterogeneous productivity. There are two locations, 
North and South. Differences between the two regions are characterised not 
by the aggregate production functions, but by differences in the productivity 
(pareto) distributions of firms. The shares of manufacturing firms in each lo­
cation are then solved for in the equilibrium by equalising the ex-ante value 
of entry in both locations. Several new results emerge from the exercise.
Explaining th e  Lack of C apital Flow to  South  Firstly, while neo­
classical models suggest that the productivity differences between North and 
South have to be very large to explain the lack of capital flow, this paper shows 
that a small improvement in North’s productivity (by changing the mean of 
the pareto distribution) can have a dramatic impact on the share of firms,
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while keeping the returns to factors equal in both locations. This therefore 
provides an alternative resolution to the Lucas paradox. Admittedly, this pa­
per does not explain why the small difference in productivity would arise in 
the first place. This question is better left to development or political-economy 
researchers [see James R. Tybout (2000) for a brief discussion].
Resolving The Paradox of R isk The second key result concerns the 
effect of risk. James R. Tybout (2000) for example notes that it is common to 
see very large plants existing side by side with very small ones in developing 
countries, even though there is little evidence to suggest plants in developing 
countries are inherently less productive. The author therefore suggests that 
this may be a result of ‘uncertainty about policies . . . poor rule of law’. The 
assumption here is that the South has a riskier productivity draw.
A well known property of the profit function is its convexity. Consider the 
example of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference function. 
For whatever the cost of production (inverse of productivity), the firm’s rev­
enue is bounded from below by zero - that is, revenue is always positive no 
matter how high the cost (and price) is. However, there is no upper bound 
to revenue. Therefore, a mean-preserving spread of productivity actually in­
creases expected profits because of the very convexity of the profit function26.
If the South were to have greater aggregate productivity risks while keeping 
its mean productivity equal to the North, this would imply that expected 
profit is higher there, and mobile capital will flow to the South until the 
expected return to capital is once again equalised for both locations. This is
26 A mean-preserving spread of expenditure will have no such effect since it will still result in 
the same expected profits since the expenditure is homogeneous of degree one in expenditure.
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the ‘paradox of risk’ for it contradicts commonplace intuition that firms shun 
locations perceived to have high risks to production. But in principle, the firm 
is a risk neutral entity. As long as the firm maximises expected profits, why 
does it care about risk?
It turns out that there is a good reason for this if one thinks of risk as 
outlined in a firm-specific productive risk in Marc J. Melitz (2003). Each firm 
will have to pay a sunk cost to attempt entry into a market. Upon the payment 
of this cost, the firm draws a level of productivity specific to itself, from an 
ex-ante distribution. The firm then makes the decision whether to continue 
production based on the level of realised productivity. If productivity is high 
enough, the firm will pay the fixed production cost and produce. Otherwise, 
the firm ‘lets bygones be bygones’ and exits.
It turns out that in equilibrium, the level of the sunk cost will have an 
impact on the location of industries. Suppose one location is riskier than 
the other while holding the mean of the productivity distribution constant. 
The riskier distribution will have fatter tails. Ceteris paribus, high sunk cost 
industries prefer to invest in less risky locations because the higher likelihood 
of entry dominates (the probability of a really bad draw is low). On the other 
hand, low sunk cost industries invest in higher risk locations (with fatter right 
side tails for productivity draws) since the chance of getting a really good 
productivity draw dominates. Given a particular sunk cost, a firm therefore 
has to balance these two effects. The model can explain why ‘hi-tech’ industries 
- characterised by high sunk costs - cluster in the less risky North while ‘low- 
tech’ industries move to the risky South.
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The Im portance  of Trade Costs Finally in the standard FC model, 
if expenditures are equal in both locations, the distribution of firms will con­
tinue to be symmetric at all levels of iceberg trade costs except zero, at which 
the point of location of production is undefined. FC models can only achieve 
asymmetric concentration of industries through the home market effect (that 
is, different expenditure shares) whereby the location with the larger expendi­
ture share has a more than proportionate share of firms. Without differences 
in expenditure shares, changes in trade costs cannot change industrial concen­
tration.
The introduction of firm heterogeneity restores the potency of trade costs. 
Different levels of trade costs will result in different concentrations of indus­
tries, even if expenditures are the same in both locations.
3.2 T h e  M o d el S e tu p
3.2.1 Endow m ents and Regions
There are two primary factors of production - capital and labour. There are 
two regions - North and South. The North has K n  units of capital and Ln  
units of labour while the South has K s  and Ls, all factors in fixed and known 
quantities. Capital is completely mobile between regions, and capital returns 
can be costlessly remitted to owners for consumption. Workers (who are also 
owners of capital) are completely immobile between regions, and their labour 
is supplied inelastically to the local market.
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3.2.2 Preferences
There are two types of goods - agriculture (a) and manufacturing (m). The 
motivation is similar to most NEG models, with the agriculture sector equal­
ising wages across economies in an equilibrium characterised by incomplete 
specialisation and without trade cost in agriculture. The j  consumer’s utility 
is given as
u 3 — m j  a j
<7
<7 — 1 <7-1
ci a di is the consumption of the Q. set of manufactured 
goods, o > 1 > n > 0 .
3.2.3 Technology and  F irm s
A griculture The agricultural sector has a constant returns to scale pro­
duction function. For simplicity, units are chosen such that 1 unit of labour 
produces 1 unit of output. As per the usual assumption for NEG models, 
the agricultural good is costlessly traded between countries. This assumption 
equalises the price of the agricultural good between North and South, and 
also equalises the wage per unit of effective labour because of the perfectly 
competitive, constant returns to scale production.
M anufacturing The manufacturing sector requires a composite factor pro­
duction k which is produced by the primary factors - capital and labour - with 
a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production technology
k = A K aLl~a
where Cmj =
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where A  is the aggregate technology parameter.
There is a large number of firms, each producing one variety. The firm’s 
technology is homothetic and represented by the familiar increasing returns 
function
©a  = f  +
<Pij
where /  is the fixed production cost and q the output. Therefore j /  +  ^  
gives the total input required of the firm in terms of k, and C is the total cost 
function given PK which is the price of the industrial composite. All firms have 
the same fixed cost but different levels of productivity ip.
Traditionally, the FC model has a disembodied technology - capital in­
puts for fixed cost and labour inputs for variable cost. Using a standard FC 
model but incorporating firm heterogeneity, Richard E. Baldwin and Toshihiro 
Okubo (2005) show how the home market effect can induce more productive 
firms to relocate to the larger market. That paper takes the ex-post produc­
tivity distribution of firms as given and ignores the entry or exit decision of 
firms. In a subsequent paper, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) introduce the en­
try and exit process. In that paper, the authors again highlight the home 
market effect, but further show how instantaneous entry and exit is a perfect 
substitute for relocation.
To achieve more analytical tractability, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) make 
some simplifying assumptions. Sunk cost, fixed export cost (beachhead cost), 
and variable production cost is borne by labour inputs only. Fixed production 
cost consists of capital only. The production technology is therefore a non- 
homothetic one, much like the standard FC model. In a firm heterogeneity
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setup however, there are many types of cost. Though it is not a criticism of 
the Baldwin and Okubo setup, it is not clear (at least theoretically) why the 
production technology should be so. Realistically, one could also think of sunk 
or beachhead cost to consist of capital only, or a combination of capital and 
labour.
This paper therefore adopts a more uniform approach towards the various 
types of costs by assuming a homothetic production technology that is more 
similar to Andrew B. Bernard, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott (2007) 
- known henceforth as BRS - where all costs require the same composition of 
inputs. There are several advantages with this setup.
Firstly, it is more realistic in that all costs will require capital and labour. 
The homotheticity of inputs towards manufacturing allows the model to be 
solved easily as in Melitz (2003) even in the presence of firm heterogeneity by 
making use of the ‘Zero Cutoff Profits’ and ‘Free Entry’ conditions. With a 
non-homothetic technology, this cannot be done. Secondly, changes in absolute 
endowments do not have an impact on firm level aggregates. Changes in 
endowments only affect the levels of composite as well as the capital-labour 
ratio. In a homothetic production setting, changes in endowments affect only 
the number of firms, relative returns of primary factors, and associated welfare, 
with no additional effect on firm level aggregates. The effect of changing 
endowments proportionately is just like changing market size. Consider the 
opposite case with a non-homothetic technology, supposing only capital is used 
for the sunk cost f e. An increase in capital endowment, relative to labour, will 
mean that there will be relatively more resources for sunk cost compared to 
production. In equilibrium, it has to be more difficult to gain entry, and
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cutoff productivity has to increase. In other words, with a non-homothetic 
technology, changes in relative endowment will affect firm level aggregates.
Finally, though this paper draws inspiration from BRS (2007), there is a 
key difference. In BRS (2007) both factors of production - skilled and unskilled 
labour - are immobile. In this paper however, one of the factors - capital - 
is completely mobile. In essence, the technology function in this paper is a 
hybrid, combining elements of various research [Martins and Roger; Melitz; 
BRS] to incorporate various useful properties.
C apital M arket This paper abstracts from any capital market imperfec­
tions by assuming that there is a well functioning capital market such that 
capital is transferred from owners to firms, and rewards are transferred cost­
lessly back to owners for consumption.
N orm alisation of Prices As the agriculture good is costlessly traded across 
the two regions, the wage rate w (yet to be solved) is therefore equalised be­
tween the two locations, assuming the consumption share of the manufactured 
good is small enough such that the agriculture sector continues to operate in 
both locations. Moreover, as capital is freely mobile across, the rental rate r 
is also equalised. The cost of the composite input k - which depends on r and 
w - will therefore be also equalised between the two regions. Applying cost 
minimisation, together setting the PK as the numeraire, gives the following 
equation
(28)
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This equilibrium relationship, in the situation of incomplete specialisation, 
allows the interest rate to be expressed in terms of wage rate and parame­
ters (or vice versa). The advantage of choosing PK as the numeraire (rather 
than wages) is that it allows all equilibrium conditions for the manufacturing 
firms to be written in terms of ac only, without having to deal with the cost 
minimising price function of At.
Furthermore, an implication of both cost minimisation and the equalisation 
of factor prices is that the rental-wage ratio can be expressed as
L m  (29)
w \1  - a ) K N + K s y }
where Lm  is the total labour used in manufacturing27. Equation (29) allows 
r to be expressed as a function of w and parameters. Substituting this into 
equation (28), one can express the labour to capital ratio in manufacturing as 
a function of w only.
3.2.4 Pareto P roductiv ity  D istributions
All manufacturing firms face an ex-ante distribution' of productivity in each 
location. This paper assumes pareto distributions for productivities in both 
North and South [Elhanan Helpman, Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple (2005); 
BRS (2007); Baldwin and Okubo (2006)]28. The parameters for the North are
27In an interior equilibrium, since r and w are common to both economies, they will have 
the same labour-capital ratios in the differentiated sectors. Hence ^ K m n  — j z ^ L m n  and 
^ K m s  =  j z ^ L m s  where K m n  and K m s  are the mobile capital deployed to the North 
and South respectively (while L m n  and L m s  are the labour employed in manufacturing 
respectively). Since all capital sums up to world endowment, ^ ( K n  +  K s ) =  j z ^ L m ,  
where L m  — L m n  +  L m s -
28 The relevant cumulative density, probability density, mean and variance are given as
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<pN and kw, where ipN specifies the minimum support and the shape of 
the distribution. The corresponding parameters for the South are (ps  and ks-
3.2.5 Sunk Cost
Firms trying to enter the manufactured goods market are required to pay a 
sunk cost of / e (again in terms of k)  to draw the firm specific productivity (p. 
As capital is completely mobile, a firm can choose to pay this cost either in 
the North or in the South, upon which its productivity will be drawn from 
the respective distribution. The paper assumes that firms are not allowed to 
relocate their investment once they have selected on the initial location. The 
reason for this assumption is simple. Firm specific productivity is assumed to 
be tied to the institutional context in which sunk cost is incurred29.
3.2.6 Trade Cost
Trade in the manufacturing sector is costly. There is a r  > 1 iceberg trade cost 
for every unit shipped. In addition, exporters will have to incur a beachhead, 
or a fixed export cost f x  in order to export. Both costs are in terms of k, paid 
in the home country. Selection into the export market will occur if there exist 
firms with productivity below p  that find it profitable to operate domestically 
(with domestic revenue r^ >) but not export (thereby foregoing revenue rx)-
where k > 2 and (pm > 0. For a pareto distribution, both mean and variance is decreasing 
in k.
29If both locations have the same ex-ante productivity distribution, no firms will relocate 
in equilibrium since the cutoffs are the same. An atomistic firm will have the same expected 
profits in both locations. If the productivity distributions are different, considering the 
effects of relocation requires an assumption to be made about whether productivity can be 
transferred across locations.
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3 .3  T rade E q u ilib r iu m  C on d itio n s
As usual, the agriculture sector equalises wages between the two locations
w = pa = p a = w
where Southern variables are denoted with the asterisk (except for variables 
related to productivity ip where locations are denoted with the subscript).
3.3.1 Export Partitioning
With CES preferences, the optimal pricing of a firm with productivity <pl is 
p(ipi) =  and the revenue given as =  p^p\L„ E, where E  is the
aggregate expenditure and P  is the CES price aggregate. The ratio of revenues 
between two firms with productivities <px and <p2 can therefore be expressed as 
^ 27 =  (^ 2)  ' furthermore, one can define a firm with cutoff productivity
ip* as the marginal firm - one that just makes enough operating profits to cover 
the fixed cost of production f .  This firm therefore satisfies the relationship of 
net operating profits equalling the fixed cost: ^r{ip*) =  / .  This allows one to 
write the revenue of a firm with an average productivity of ip (to be defined 
later) as a function of the cutoff productivity ip* only
r (v) =  1 ^ ) /
Average profits from domestic sales become
=  / - /  =
- \  (7 — 1 
^  1 
V  '
/
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Analogously, profits from exporting become
7Tx =
a—1
f x
where <px  is the export cutoff (greater than </?*) because of the exporting 
partition condition which is assumed to hold (that is, not all firms export), 
and <f>x is the average productivity of exporters.
3.3.2 Average Profits
Given these standard derivations, the average profits in the North can be 
written as
7r (£ n_
V*N
a—1
- 1 f  + P X Vn x
<Pn x
a—1
-  1 f x (30)
where ip*N is the cutoff productivity for entry, (pN the average productivity 
of all Northern firms above the cutoff, <PpfX the cutoff productivity into ex­
port, and &NX is the average productivity of Northern exporters. Since only 
those manufacturers with a productivity draw greater than <p*NX can export, 
the term px  = gives the conditional probability of having a high
enough productivity to export, conditional upon entry. In short, conditioned 
on successful entry, the first term on the right hand side gives the expected 
profits from domestic sales while the second term gives the expected profits 
from exporting.
The analogous expression for the South is
7r
© r 1 - 1 f  +  P x i l\ V s x J
f x (31)
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where p*x  =  is the conditional probability of exporting in the South.
The marginal firms in the North and South, with productivities <p*N and 
(pg, recover only the fixed cost of production /  in equilibrium. This gives the 
following relationship
1 1 —<T fiE
p i —a = a f  = cr-l<p*s )
1 —  <7 fiE*
p *  l —a (32)
These are effectively zero profit conditions that will help pin down the pro­
ductivity cutoffs in equilibrium.
3.3.3 P roductiv ities o f N orthern and Southern Firm s
As with the usual derivations in such models, average productivities of North­
ern and Southern firms - CpN and tps  - are functions of the respective cutoffs 
only30. The pareto productivity distributions allow the ratios between the 
average productivities and their respective cutoffs to be written as a func­
tion of parameters only =  ^ jV^ [_cr > with analogous
expressions holding for the South.
Together, these properties give the extremely useful result that ^  =  (^ JL 
with the pareto productivity distributions. Though exporters have a higher 
average productivity, the ratio of average productivity of all producers to 
the entry cutoff is exactly the same as the ratio of average productivity of 
all exporters to the export cutoff. Plugging these conditions into equations 
(30) and (31) greatly simplifies these expressions and the characterisation of
30These are <pN = [ l-Gji(y^) -C*, V° * and Vs =
[ i-Gg(v»*) /J* l9s{y>)dtp^  a 1. With pareto productivity distributions, these can
be further simplified to (pN = [ fcwfo[_g] "_1 <p*N and (ps =  "~1 Vs-
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equilibrium.
Finally, a firm with ip*N makes zero profits in the domestic market, while 
a firm with (f*NX makes zero profits from exporting (with the analogous rela­
tionships holding for the South as well)31.
3.3.4 A ggregate P roductiv ity  and Prices
The aggregate productivity and price level in a location depend not only on 
domestic firms, but also on foreign firms selling there. Define the total number 
of varieties in the North by M  = n + p*x n*. This indicates that the number 
of varieties in the North is made up of n domestic firms and px n* of South­
ern firms that are successful in exporting to the North. The corresponding 
expression for the South is M* = px ri‘+ n*.
The average productivity of the North becomes the weighted average of 
productivities of Northern firms and Southern exporters
<p - 1 + PW<t>Vsx) (33)
where (f> — r 1 a is the freedom of trade index. The corresponding equation 
for the South can be written as
ip =
_i_
j p  {pxnHf^x + "VS-1) (34)
With these definitions of productivities, the aggregate price levels in the North
31 When the countries are symmetric, the respective export cutoffs are a function of produc­
tion cutoffs and parameters only, with <p*NX — (Pnt ( ^ )  “  ^ ancl Vsx =  <PsT ( ^ )  * 1 •
When the countries are not symmetric, one can show that (p^ x = T ( ^ )  * Vs an(i
<P*sx =  r  1 Vn tsee Svetlana Demidova (2006)]
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and South are given as
p  =  M r b _ f _ I  P *  =  (35)
a - l i p  a - l i p *  v '
This completes the characterisation of the aggregate price levels for both loca­
tions. The aggregate prices P  and P* in equation (35) can also be substituted 
into the marginal firm conditions in equation (32), allowing the zero profit 
conditions to be expressed as function of firm mass and productivity cutoffs 
only.
3.3.5 Equalisation o f E xpected  Values o f Entry in N orth  and South
Free entry ensures that the ex-ante value of entry must be equal for both
locations if there is to be an interior solution (with manufacturing firms in
both locations) The condition for an interior equilibrium can be written as
fcjv
pTTN = P*n*s = fe, where p = 1 -  GN(ip*N) =  N and p* = 1 -  Gs (ip*s ) =
are the entry probabilities of the North and South respectively32. 
With the appropriate substitutions, this expression can be explicitly written
as
p I  kN T T ^ H f + p x f x )  = fe
p' ( k j +  1 -  a ) ( f  + P'xfx) = fe (36)
where px  and jp*x  are the conditional probabilities of exporting.
32 If manufacturing concentrates completely in one location, one of these equalities will not 
hold. Expected profits in one location do not cover the sunk cost f e in equilibrium and no 
manufacturing firms locate there. This can be used to pin down the break/sustain point.
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3.3.6 M arket Clearing
There are in equilibrium n successful entrants in the North and n* in the 
South. But due to the cutoffs, the number of firms that attempt entry has 
to be higher. The total number of firms that attempt entry, including those 
below the cutoffs, is
n * n
ne = ~ ne = —*p p*
where ne and n* are the total number of entry attempts in the North and 
South respectively.
The composite input k is used for four purposes - sunk cost ( /e), fixed pro­
duction cost (/) , marginal production cost, and export costs (this is incurred 
by exporters only). The key to note here is that even unsuccessful entrants will 
use up industrial inputs. The marginal cost for each firm is a firm-specific 
variable. The aggregate variable production cost in the North can be written 
35 71 ( fcjy+i-a) (a — 1)/ [see Appendix B:3.8.2]. Aggregate composite input 
used in the North becomes
K = n{/ + G* + 1 - J  (ff_1)/+# + f a [/ v + (fcw + l - a )  (a~ 1)l7
(37)
Multiplied by the number of firms, the first term within the brackets on the 
right hand side is the total fixed production cost. The second term on the 
right (again multiplied by the number of firms n ) is the aggregate variable 
cost of all firms. The third term (multiplied by the number of firms) is the 
total sunk cost incurred, including that of the unsuccessful firms. Finally,
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the terms inside the square brackets (multiplied by the number of firms) are 
the total beachhead and exporting production costs, which are incurred by 
exporters only. An analogous term can be written for the South
« * - « * • { / + (  ks + l - a )  +
(38)
The above two expressions therefore give the quantity of the composite input 
ac demanded in the North and South respectively.
Due to the cost minimisation property, the derived demand for capital 
is K  = (7 ) 1 a k - ^  substituting the demands of ac into the
appropriate conditional demands, one can derive the demands of the primary 
factors capital and labour. Since the total demand of capital in the world must 
be equal to the endowment, the capital clearing condition can be written as
Equation (39) converts the industrial inputs into capital by substituting /c in 
equations (37) and (38) into the appropriate cost-minimising function. This 
is the first market clearing equation.
Similarly, since the conditional demand for labour (for manufacturing) 
can be written as L — the total labour requirement for
manufacturing becomes
(40)
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As labour is also used for agriculture, the total manufacturing labour does 
not equal to the total labour endowment. Instead, the amount of labour 
available for agriculture is whatever labour not used in manufacturing. This 
has to be equal to the real demand for agricultural goods (nominal expenditure 
divided by the price of agriculture goods, which is w), giving the agricultural 
market (or labour market) clearing condition
L\v — L m  =  (1 — t*)
E  +  E*
w
(41)
Substituting equation (40) into (41) then provides the second market clearing 
condition. With CES preferences, the manufacturing goods market clears since 
the expenditure on each firm is equal to its revenue. With Walras’s Law, the 
agriculture market also clears.
3.3.7 A ggregate E xpenditure
As owners of capital are immobile, all capital returns are remitted to the 
owners and consumed locally. The aggregate expenditures for the North and 
South are simply their respective factor endowments multiplied by the rental 
and wage rates, which are the same across countries in the incomplete special­
isation equilibrium
E  : rKjsi +  wLn  E* = tK s +  wLs
3.3.8 Equilibrium  Solution
The endogenous variables for equilibrium are {iu, n*} - although
the interest rate is endogenous, it can be recovered by equation (28). For the
five endogenous variables, the equilibrium is pinned down (after appropriate 
substitutions) by (i) two ex-ante free entry conditions in equation (36); (ii) 
zero profit condition in equation (32); and two market clearing conditions in 
equation (39) and (41).
3.3.9 Solving for Global M anufacturing Labour
From equation (41), the global production of agriculture is
Lw ~ Lm  =  (1 — aO
= (i - m)
E  + E*
w
rK w  +  wL\y
w
— (1 — A4) ■K w  +  Lwlw
The second equality makes use of the fact that the global expenditure is a 
function of wage-rental and global endowments E-\-E* =  rRw +w Lw -  Substi­
tuting the rental-wage ratio from equation (29) then allows the world’s labour 
employed in manufacturing to be expressed as a function of endowments and 
parameters only
Lm = M 1 -  «)1 — aji Lw (42)
Note that fi (which is the share of manufacturing in consumption) has to be 
less than 1 for j , the share of global labour in manufacturing, to also
be less than 1.
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3.3.10 Solving for Rental-W age R atio
Substituting equation (42) back to equation (29) then allows the rental-wage 
ratio to be expressed as a function of parameters only
r OtfJL L \ y (43)w 1  —  OtfJL K w
Note that the rental-wage ratio is also unaffected by any firm level variables. 
It depends on the endowments ratio and parameters only.
3.3.11 Solving for Total C om posite Resource
Equation (40) gives the relationship between L m  and the composite resource
K + K*
The total composite resource available to the manufacturing sector is an in­
creasing function of endowments, aggregate technology A, and share of manu­
facturing consumption f i  (because this reduces the amount of labour required
Substituting equations (42) and (43) into the above will give
k, +  ac* =  A( 1 — a) (44)
for agriculture). This therefore pins down the total composite factor supply
in terms of endowments and parameters only.
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3.4 W hen the N orth Is More Productive
From the free entry conditions in equation (36),
P  1 ° t 1 ( /  +  P x f x )  =  P *  (  ? <7I 1 1—  ) ( /  +  P * x f x )kw 4- 1 — a k s  +  1 -  cr
Since k  =  k ^  =  k s ,  this condition becomes
P  { f  +  P x f x ) =  P*  ( f  +  P x f x )
Writing this equation more explicitly
Vn \ *
Vn ) W n x J V s )
f x
\ V s x J
From here, the paper states a few simplifying relationships. First, ipN = 
tp<Ps where ip > 1 represents the rightward shift of North’s support for the pro­
ductivity distribution. Second, one can make use of the following relationships 
<p*NX ~  T (^f") Vs an<l  Vsx = T (^f") a l V*n  when solving for cutoffs for 
asymmetric countries where Z  = r  ° 1 [see Demidova (2006)]. Third, let 
rjk =  be the ratio of the two fixed cost. Using these simple relationships, 
the above equation can be further simplified to
± \ k
Vm )
f Z k<pf + v % f x
Z kip*J°
_l V
V s ) zk(p*kN
After cancellations of terms, one can simplify this to
„l,k f iykl.*k   r7k,.*k , ,~*k^k
V \ z  Vs  + Vn P )  =  z  Vn  + V s P
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By grouping the terms, one can express one cutoff as a function of another
V n  —
Tjk -  kzk
ipk<qk — Z k V s  — v V s (45)
where v  = T)k-lPkZk 
V>kr)k—Z k
> 1 is simply a function of parameters only.
3.4.1 Solving for Cutoffs
This subsection solves for South’s productivity cutoff using the free entry 
condition
f e = F
a — 1
ks  +  1 -  a ( f  +  P*xfx)
Since the probability of entry is given as p* =  and the conditional
probability of export p*x  =  — ( i ^ - ) ’ above equation becomes
f e  =
V s  J \ k  +-1 — a
(46)
This gives the analytical closed-form solution to South’s cutoff <p*s . The North­
ern cutoff can be derived from equation (45). With these productivity cutoffs, 
the export cutoffs can also be derived. The break point - where all firms locate 
in the North - is characterised in the Appendix.
3.4.2 A ggregate and Firm -Level Variables
In characterising this equilibrium, a few facts stand out. Firstly, the equilib­
rium rental-wage ratio in equation (43) is unaffected by any firm level vari­
ables. The amount of industrial resources n +  k* in equation (44) available 
for the differentiated sector is also independent of firm level variables. These 
are all functions of endowments and other parameters only. As mentioned
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before, symmetric changes in endowments (relative or absolute), therefore do 
not have any impact on firm level variables. Secondly, firm level productivity 
cutoffs are solved through the free entry conditions in equation (36), and are 
also completely independent from interest or wage rates. The only interaction 
between firm-level and aggregate variables is how the size of resources k + k* 
affect the number of firms in equilibrium.
This is the key property of the homothetic production function. The same 
intuition is highlighted by Melitz (2003) with a single factor of production, 
where the size of the market affects only the number of firms in equilibrium, 
not firm level aggregates. Though North and South have different cutoffs due 
the difference in the productivity distributions, changes in endowments do 
not affect respective cutoff productivities or average profits. To the atomistic 
firm, the supply of factors is completely elastic. The size of the endowment 
will determine only the number of firms in equilibrium. Relative endowment 
will affect the ^  ratio required to clear the respective markets, but otherwise 
will also have no impact on firm level aggregates.
3.4.3 A  Num erical Exam ple
This subsection provides a simple numerical example to illustrate the equilib­
rium characterised33. This paper does not make any empirical estimates on 
any parameters. Instead, parameters on preferences and pareto distribution 
are taken from existing research. The choice of endowment is arbitrary. How­
33 Numerical solutions are obtained through MATLAB. An initial estimate is provided for 
all the variables. The endogenous variables are then solved through the equilibrium condi­
tions, and incremental updates in each round are carried out by taking the weighted average 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ solutions, until there are no further changes (convergence). The 
solution method is similar to Krugman (1991) and BRS (2007). I am grateful to Stephen 
Redding for sharing the MATLAB codes.
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ever, the same level of endowment is chosen for the North and South in order 
not to introduce the home market effect that would otherwise be evident in an 
Economic Geography model. This assumption will be relaxed later to bring 
out the home market effect. The list of parameters is provided in Appendix 
B:3.8.1. The set of cost parameters is { f , f e, fx ,T } .  These parameters will 
also be varied in various numerical solutions to highlight the effects of changes 
in them.
In the first set of numerical solutions, North and South have the same 
distribution shape kw = ks =  3.6. However, North is given a better pro­
ductivity compared to the baseline scenario, CpN =  0.205 > <pg = 0 .2 . This 
shifts the North’s distribution rightwards (first degree stochastic dominance). 
The North is 2.5 per cent more productive than the South on the basis of the 
unconditional mean.
Even though North and South have the same level of expenditure (given the 
same level of endowment), the slight perturbation of the pareto distributions 
results in dramatic differences in industry location. The equilibrium effects on 
industrial concentration are presented in Table 5 for three different levels of 
trade cost (the Tomahawk diagram will be presented in a later section).
Table 5: Share of Firms and Capital in More Productive North
/  -  10 f e = 10 f x  = 10 r  =  1.40 r  =  1.30 r  =  1.20
Share of Firms 0.535 0.566 0.661
Share of Capital 0.550 0.590 0.700
The firm-level variables with a relatively low level of trade cost r  =  1.10 
are presented in Table 6 .
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Table 6: Equilibrium Variables with More Productive North
For r  = 1.20 N orth South
Cutoff Productivity 0.3358 0.3104
Probability of Successful Entry 0.1693 0.2054
Average Firms’ Productivity, on entry 0.5745 0.5312
Aggregate Price Levels 0.1331 0.1440
The results show that a reasonably small perturbation in the productivity 
distribution in the North can have a significant impact on the location of 
firms and capital. A 2.5 per cent increase in the unconditional mean of the 
productivity distribution creates a high concentration of industrial activity in 
the North at a intermediate-low level of trade cost of r  =  1.20 (Table 5). The 
intuition becomes clear in Table 6 . The better productivity distribution in 
the North means that firms there are more productive and profitable. More 
firms need to move there until the effects of local market competition cancel 
out any productivity advantages.
Another striking feature of this equilibrium is that in an interior equilib­
rium r and w are in fact the same in both locations, despite a higher level 
of capital in the North. The South continues to have a lower aggregate ^  
ratio compared to the North, but the marginal returns to capital is the same 
in both North and South. The Lucas paradox disappears. The superiority 
of the North is not in the aggregate production .function, but is due to an 
improvement in firm-specific productivity draws.
Thirdly, the fall in trade cost will accentuate the advantages of locating in 
the North even though the levels of expenditure are the same in each location. 
In the traditional FC model, if the expenditures of both locations are the same, 
location of firms will be symmetric at all positive levels of trade cost. The 
concentration of industry depends on the home market effect. In other words,
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trade cost is completely ‘impotent’ in creating asymmetric concentration when 
the two markets are of equal size.
This is however not the case here. Expenditure is the same in both loca­
tions, but the fall in trade cost brings about an increasing concentration of 
industry to the North. The key to understanding this lies in the inspection 
of equations (33) and (34). Because the North has a superior productivity 
distribution, its firms are more productive in equilibrium. In autarky, North 
and South’s CES price indices only reflect the productivities of their domestic 
firms.
Therefore, with the opening to trade and the fall in trade cost, the increase 
in </> creates a greater increase in weighted average productivity in the South (p* 
compared with (p. Competitive pressure intensifies more quickly in the South 
with a fall in trade cost, thereby accentuating the advantages of locating in the 
North. Conversely, Northern firms are less affected by the effects of increased 
competition as a result of freer trade since they are more productive than their 
Southern counterparts.
3 .5  T h e  Im p act o f  R isk
In the previous sub-section, the North is more attractive due to its better pro­
ductivity distribution. However, suppose the South is not less productive but 
riskier. How will this change the distribution of capital and firms? It is impor­
tant that the impact of risk is clearly understood since one of the competing 
hypotheses on why relatively little capital flows to the South is the inherent 
riskiness in investing there (expropriation risk, political risk etc). In this set 
of numerical solutions, it is precisely this effect that is being modelled by al­
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lowing the two productivity distributions to have the same mean productivity 
but greater dispersion in the South.
In this set of numerical solutions, the North has the following minimum 
support (pN =  0.205 > (pg = 0.2. Moreover, the shape of the North’s dis­
tribution is tighter with kx  = 3.8 > ks = 3.6. The result of this is that 
the unconditional productivity means in both locations are the same with 
cn — cs — 0.277. However, the variance in the North is 16 per cent smaller 
than the South. The set of parameters in fact creates a ‘mean preserving 
spread’ of the productivity distribution in the South. The South is not less 
productive on average, but has higher risk as characterised by the higher vari­
ance. The numerical solution to the equilibrium firm shares, with a moderate 
level of trade cost r  =  1.2 and different levels of sunk cost / e, are presented in 
Table 7.
Table 7: Share of Firms and Capital in Less Risky North with Different Sunk 
Cost ___________________________________________________
r  =  1.30 / e =  10 f x  = 10 f e  =  5
oII< oCOII
Share of Firms 0.288 0.335 0.396
Share of Capital 0.196 0.244 0.309
The firm-level variables with r  =  1.20 and f e = 30 are presented in Table
8 .
Table 8 : Equilibrium Variables with Riskier South
For t  =  1.30 and f e =  30 N o rth South
Cutoff Productivity 0.2121 0.2370
Probability of Successful Entry 0.8629 0.5422
Average Firms’ Productivity, upon entry 0.3416 0.4057
Aggregate Price Levels 0.2108 0.1886
The results of this sub-section show the effects of greater variance in the
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productivity distribution. There is a tendency for industrial concentration in 
the South. The higher variance in the South implies that there is a fatter right 
side tail for the pareto distribution. As can be seen from Table 8 , the effect of 
this is that although the probability of entry is lower in the South, the average 
productivity upon successful entry is in fact higher in the South due to the 
fatter right tail.
P roposition  6  When expenditures are equal in both locations, increasing sunk 
cost f e will result in greater share of industry for the North.
Proof. See Appendix B:3.8.4. ■
What is the economic intuition here? After a firm invests in the sunk cost 
and discovers its productivity, it can decide whether to incur the fixed produc­
tion cost / .  Incurring the sunk cost creates an option whether to produce, as 
a firm has a choice of whether to carry out production. At low values of the 
sunk cost, the South is more attractive since it offers a greater probability of 
a high productivity draw (and higher average productivity). At higher values 
of the sunk cost however, this option effectively becomes more expensive and 
reduces the attraction of the South.
To understand the impact that cutoffs have on distribution of capital, it 
is useful to first think of ex-ante entry conditions without cutoffs. Suppose a 
firm has to make a decision to enter either the North or South market in one 
stage. In other words, there is no separation of f e and /  - a firm discovers 
its productivity and can begin production without any further investment. 
Further suppose that the South has a higher productivity spread. With the 
CES demand, the revenue function is always bounded from below by zero
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but has no upper bound. A higher productivity spread in the South in fact 
increases the ex-ante profits, thereby drawing more firms there until any ex- 
ante difference is equalised. This is the effect seen in Figure 3, where the 
same CES revenue function is superimposed on the probability densities of 
the North and South’s productivity distribution.
Figure 3: Effects on Expected Revenue with Different North-South Produc­
tivity Distributions
P.d.f
South North R evenue function
Productivity spread North
High productivity spread South
The narrow right side tail of the North means that it is giving up the po­
tential for high productivity draws and high profits. Because of the convexity 
of the revenue function, a firm in the North will have lower expected profits, 
ceteris paribus. If North and South have similar expenditures, more firms will 
have to locate to the South until profits are equalised.
However, given a two stage entry game (/e to discover productivity and /  
to produce), the riskier location can imply a smaller probability of entry. With
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the cutoff productivity in a two stage entry decision, revenue functions are now 
truncated left of the cutoff (see Figure 4). Given that the two locations have 
different productive distributions, the effect is asymmetric.
Figure 4: Effects of Cutoffs on Expected Revenue (Truncation) 
P.d.f
South North R evenue function
Productivity spread North
High productivity spread South
The revenue function is truncated (falls to zero) left of the respective cut­
offs. The probability of successful entry can become higher in the North, 
dominating any foregone probability of an high probability draw in the South. 
If that happens, more firms will have to locate to the North. It is also possible 
that potential for high productivity draws in the South to dominate the higher 
entry probability in the South, and more firms locate to the South in that case. 
Expected profits are determined by two components - firstly the probability 
of successful entry and secondly, the expected productivity and profitability 
post-entry. It is the balance of these two margins that changes the relative
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attractiveness of each location.
Consider then the effect of the sunk cost f e. A higher f e will always shift 
the cutoffs to the left while a lower f e shifts cutoff rightwards. As f e increases 
and cutoffs shift leftwards, the probability of successful entry always rises faster 
in the North since it has a narrower productivity distribution. Conversely as 
f e falls, North’s entry probability falls faster than the South’s. The level of 
f e therefore changes the balance of the two margins affecting a firm’s decision 
on where to locate. Ignoring the effect of market size for the moment and 
keeping expenditures the same in both locations, increasing f e will increase 
the expected profits of North and result in more firms locating there, and vice 
versa [see Appendix B-.3.8.4].
3 .6  E x ten s io n  to  M u lti-In d u stry  an d  L arger N o rth
In this section, the paper further generalises the results to an economy with 
more than one differentiated industry. As before, there are two regions North 
and South - where both have the same mean productivity, but South is riskier. 
The productivity distributions are the same as the previous section34. What 
is different here is that there are two differentiated sectors, A  and B. The 
consumption shares are identical at fi = 0.15 (this is kept small so that the 
agriculture sector continues to operate in both locations). There are no inter­
industry linkages. Furthermore, the North is given an endowment advantage 
- its capital and labour endowment are 20 per cent more than the South - 
roughly in line with the idea that developed markets are bigger in size. The 
paper then shows using numerical solutions how market size can interact with
34Where (pN =  0.2077 > ips =  0.2 and fcjv =  4 > ks = 3.6.
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the level of sunk costs to result in different types of specialisation as trade 
becomes freer.
The two differentiated sectors have exactly the same industrial structure 
except for one difference. Industry A  is a high-tech industry with a sunk 
cost of f e(A) = 30, while industry B  is a low-tech industry with a sunk 
cost of f e(B) =  1. The two industries have exactly the same cost structure 
otherwise with /  =  10 and f x  — 10. They also have the same iceberg trade 
cost. These assumptions are not meant to be realistic. For example, industries 
with lower sunk cost (low-tech) tend to have higher elasticity of substitution. 
The assumptions are kept as simple as possible here, only for the purpose of 
illustrating how two industries with different f e can end up concentrating at 
different locations with different ex-ante productivity distributions.
3.6.1 Tomahawk Diagram
The paper has thus far not presented any Tomahawk diagrams since all intu­
ition will be captured in this section. In the diagram, the level of trade cost 
falls from the left to the right in the X-axis (0 increases from 0 to 1). The 
Y-axis are the shares of industries located in the North35. The Tomahawk 
diagram for two industries is presented in Figure 536.
As trade becomes freer (from left to right of the diagram), the breakpoints 
are reached37. At the break point of industry A, all firms in this industry 
are located in the North. At 0# the break point of industry B, all firms in
35 For industry A, North’s share is defined as —’Y ♦ where ha and n*A are the numbernA 1 n A
of firms in equilibrium (for zero profits) for the North and South respectively. Similarly for 
industry B, North’s share is defined as —n.p , .J » nB+nB
36Note that the shares under autarky are not symmetric since North and South do not 
have the same productivity distribution.
37The break and sustained point are the same for a FC model.
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Figure 5: Tomahawk Diagram with Industries of Two Different Sunk Costs 
Share in North
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the industry are located in the South. Again, it is important to emphasize 
here that North and South will have the same expenditures for each industry. 
The implication from the analysis is that as trade becomes freer, industries 
with low sunk costs will migrate to the South while industries with high sunk 
costs will migrate to the North. The different profiles of the productivity 
distributions results in different types of specialisation.
3 .7  C onclusion
By synthesising a variant of a New Economic Geography model with recent 
research into the effects of trade equilibrium under firm heterogeneity, this
n a n e r  s h o w s  t h ? ^  ic  n r v je iK lp  t n  r n t . in n n lit j p  t t i p  VnorVilv n s v m m p t r i r  f l l ln p n t if> n
Introducing firm heterogeneity allows the differences between North and 
South to be modelled by way of firm-level differences rather than through the 
aggregate production function. With a slight improvement in the North’s pro­
ductivity distribution (first degree stochastic dominance), this paper demon­
strates that it is possible to explain the high concentration of firms (and cap­
ital) to the North, even though returns to factors of production and expen­
ditures are completely identical between the two regions. The Lucas paradox 
disappears as a result.
The second key result of the paper demonstrates how the presence of sunk 
costs in a two-stage entry process can resolve the paradox of risk. ‘Hi-tech’ 
or high sunk cost industries tend to locate in the less risky North because it 
offers them a greater probability of successful entry relative to the South. For 
‘low-tech’ industries with low sunk costs, the North is less attractive since the 
increase in the probability of entry is offset by the potential of higher post-entry 
productivity in the South. Capital flows in both directions can be rationalised 
depending on the level of sunk costs. In a setup with two differentiated sectors, 
it is possible to show how the high sunk cost industry concentrates in the North 
and the low sunk cost industry concentrates in the South as trade becomes 
freer. This result is easily generalised to a multi-industry framework, where the 
less risky North enjoys a comparative advantage in high sunk cost industries 
while the South has a comparative advantage in low sunk cost ones. Greater 
trade liberalisation will lead to both regions specialising in a different set of 
industries.
The paper also shows how the level of capital flows also depend crucially 
on the level of trade costs. If trade costs are high, capital will to a large
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extent be distributed according to expenditure shares. With low trade costs, 
‘low-tech’ industries will locate in the South. This can then explain some 
stylised differences in the flow of capital to different developing economies. 
Developing countries with lower trade restrictions will receive more capital 
particularly from ‘low-tech’ industries.
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3 .8  A p p e n d ix  B
3.8.1 Calibration o f Num erical Sim ulation
Parameter values are referenced to various research where possible. The list 
of parameters is given in the table below.
Table 9: Parameters and References
Parameters Value Remarks
Preferences
a 3.8 Referenced to Bernard et al (2003), Ghironi and Melitz (2004) and BRS (2007) estimate of 3.8.
M 0.5
Arbitrary, no effect on firm aggregates or distribution 
of firms between the locations, so long as it is small 
enough such that agriculture continues to exist in both 
economies.
Endowment
Kn
Ln
K s
Ls
1,000,000
Endowments are kept large relative to the fixed cost 
in order to have an arbitrarily large number of firms 
in equilibrium. Endowments are symmetric between 
North and South except for one set of solutions where 
the home market effect is modelled by increasing 
North's endowment by 20 per cent.
Pareto Distribution
<P 0.2
The baseline support is referenced to BRS (2007). 
However, in the various sets of simulations, the 
support is varied.
k 3.6
The baseline shape is referenced to BRS (2007). 
However, in the various sets of simulations, the shape 
is varied.
Technology
A 1 Aggregate productivity is normalised to unity for convenience.
a 0.3
This is the capital share in the production of the 
composite input. Its effect is only on the wage-rental 
ratio, and has no effect on distribution of firms.
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3.8.2 D eriving Total R esource Cost
This subsection proceeds to solve for the total variable production cost in 
order to pin down the input requirements for the manufacturing sector [see 
equations (37) and (38)].
Consider a standard total variable production cost (TC ) function. This 
is the integration of the resources used by each firm (marginal cost ^ 
multiplied by quantity q(ip)) over the entire distribution of active firms above 
the cutoff <p*
ip 1 -G(<p*) ip\<pj 1 -G{<p*)
The second equality makes use of the property that q(ip) = q((p) (jPj . With 
the pareto distribution and the definition of q(p), the above equation can then 
be simplified to
T C = / ;  = „  f ^ _ i 9w
k + 1 — a <p*
Total production cost is a n  factor of the variable production cost of
the marginal firm —~ P .
Consider Multiplying the numerator and denominator by p{<p*) will
give Since the marginal firm’s revenue r(<p*)
must cover a f  in equilibrium, and its optimal price is p((p*) = ^r, it is
possible to simplify the equation further to — (a — 1)/. This allows the
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total cost equation to be written as
(Bl)
Similarly, the total cost to the exporters can be written as
These expressions are then used in equations (37) and (38).
3.8.3 Characterising the Break Point
In FC models, the break points and sustain points are the same since there are 
no agglomeration effects - whether the initial condition is one of symmetry or 
asymmetry does not change the outcome. One can begin to solve for the break 
point by using equation (32). By writing out the aggregate price aggregates 
explicitly
Vn <Ps
*cr—l
1 + F x n *(t*Psx Pxnf iVNX  +  n *Vs 1
Dividing the numerator and denominator of the LHS by ip*£ 1 and the right 
hand side by (ptf-1 , one can further simplify the equation to
1 1
n + p*x n*<i)Za 1 pxn(j)Za 1 + n*
or
pxn<f)Za 1 +  n* =  n + p*x n*<f)Za 1
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This equation gives the relationship between n and n*. When all firms are 
concentrated in the North, n* = 0. Hence
p x t Z * - 1 =  1
Recall that px  = giving
7/>fcTfc77<7- 1 — 77 1 _ i
 ---- — 71k = r r ] ^
r k T]<r-l — 'ip'tf)
(47)
which provides the implicit solution to the break point - defined as the smallest 
level of r  that satisfy the above equation. For simplicity, one can assume 
f x  — f  [such as in Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2006)] or 77 =  1. The above 
equation reduces to
The bigger advantage the North is given (higher i/>), the higher the r  that can 
satisfy this condition.
3.8.4 Equilibrium C onditions w ith  M ean Preserving Spread for
In principle, one can solve for the full equilibrium, including the break/sustain 
point, in the same manner as when the North is given a productivity advan­
tage. However, because the South’s productivity distribution no longer has 
the same shape as the North k x  ^  k s , it is also not possible for terms to 
cancel out to arrive at the simple relationship. More importantly, depending 
on the level of f e, it is possible that <p*N > <p*s  (high f e) or <p*N < (p*s (low
South
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/ e) [see Figure 6], making it difficult to generalise the marginal firm condition 
in equation (32) to an explicit relationship between n and n*, as in equation 
(??). Instead, this subsection proceeds to provide some comparative static 
analytical results, while the numerical results are presented in the main text.
If the North has a higher support but a narrow distribution such that the 
unconditional means are the same, the equilibrium can be depicted by Figure 
6 .
Figure 6 : Effects of Mean-Preserving Spread of Productivity Distribution 
3i{<PhGi(ip\)
3 S 3n
Low f t
In the case of low f e, the average productivity of Southern firms is higher 
than the North since the cutoff is higher there (<££ > <p*N) and that the prob­
ability mass right of is thicker [see Figure 6]. With low / e, more firms will 
have to locate in the South to equalise ex-ante profits between the two loca­
tions. Conversely if f e is high enough, South’s cutoff ip*s  will be low enough
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relative to ip*N such that even the fatter tails cannot compensate. In that case, 
more firms will locate to the North.
Effects of Increasing Sunk Cost Ignoring the differences between 
North and South for the moment. Consider only the marginal impact of an 
increase in the sunk cost f e . From the ex-ante free entry condition
<j — l 
k  +  1 — <j
/  + I  ( J - '  a_1T \ f x f x ) = f e
The mean of a pareto distribution is given as c = To keep the mean
constant at c while allowing k to vary, the minimum support has to be different. 
The minimum support can be written as
<P
c{k — 1) 
k
This can be substituted into the previous equation to give
*—k c(k — 1)
k
<7 — 1 
k -|- 1 — <7 /  +
1 f  f  \
T \ f x
f X } = f e  (B4)
Partially differentiating <p* with respect to f e gives
dtp*
d f e
-<P*fc+i
] j/+ [?{h)’ '] fxk
(B5)
In equilibrium, equation (B4) will always hold (envelope condition). This
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allows equation (B5) to be simplified to
di p*  —ip*
d f e k f e
(B6)
This result shows that an increase in f e always reduces the cutoffs ip* - this is 
a standard result. But what are the second order effects when one specifically 
considers the pareto distribution? Equation (B6) shows that is more neg­
ative at lower level of k (higher variance). The cutoff therefore falls relatively 
more quickly for the location with the lower k.
The probability of entry p is given as
P  =
c(k — 1)
kip*
The effect of increase in f e on entry probability can be found by the partial 
derivative
d p  _  d p  d i p*  
d f e d i p*  d f e
k ,„*—k
(B7)c{k — 1) ip"k f e
Since ] *s increasing in k ,  the increase in f e therefore increases the 
probability of entry relatively more quickly for a location with higher k  (lower 
variance).
Firstly, equation (B6) says that with an increase in / e, the cutoff ip* falls 
relatively faster for a location with higher variance (which is the South in 
the context of the discussion). Since average productivity is a function of the 
cutoff only, this implies that the average productivity falls relatively quickly in
109
the South as well. Secondly, equation (B7) says that the probability of entry 
p  is higher when f e is higher, but this entry probability increases relatively 
slower for the location with the higher variance (South). This implies that as 
f e rises, the average productivity and probability of entry must rise relatively 
less in the location with the higher variance (South). As the sunk cost f e 
increases, the ex-ante profit of the South falls relative to the North and more 
firms will have to locate in the North to restore the equilibrium.
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4  E volu tion  o f  L ocations, Specia lisation  and R eturns  
to  Factors W ith  T w o W aves o f  G lobalisation
4 .1  In tr o d u ctio n
A H istorical and  C ontem porary  Overview In 1750, before the In­
dustrial Revolution, China and India produced almost 60 per cent of the 
world’s manufactured goods. Yet, at the turn of the 20th century, the UK 
was considered the workshop of the world as it produced and exported a huge 
range of manufactured goods. China and India’s share of world manufactur­
ing became minuscule. Manufacturing was also highly concentrated. Three 
countries - UK, Germany and the United States - accounted for more than 50 
per cent of global manufacturing output in 1900 [Figure 7]38.
Today, manufacturing is but a small share of the UK’s GDP, falling from 
30 per cent in 1973 to 16 per cent in 200339. In its place, a thriving service 
sector has emerged as epitomised by the city of London. UK exports services 
to the rest of the world in exchange for manufactured goods. Its per capita 
service exports are the highest among the G-7 major industrialised nations. 
In 2006, its service trade recorded a US$53 billion surplus while merchandise 
trade recorded a deficit of US$143 billion, a persistent pattern of exporting 
services and importing manufactured goods [Figure 8]. If one considers only 
two broad categories of production - goods and services - and breaks down 
the current account as such, a clear pattern of specialisation amongst major 
developed and emerging economies has also emerged [See Appendix C:4.7.1].
38 Paul Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980”
39Source: Confederation of British Industries (CBI).
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Figure 7: Share of World Manufacturing 1750 - 1900 
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English speaking countries like the UK, United States, Australia, and even 
India are increasingly specialising in services and exporting them on a net 
basis.
On the other side of the world, a different process is taking place. East 
Asian economies, including China, have been rapidly industrialising as they be­
come more integrated with the global economy. Within the last three decades, 
China has transformed itself from an agrarian economy to become one of the 
largest exporters of manufactured goods to the developed countries. There is 
a great concentration of manufacturing activities in the cities along China’s 
eastern coast and in East Asia more generally. Today, China, Japan and Ko­
rea are some of the largest net exporters of manufactured goods, alongside 
Germany and Brazil [See Appendix:4.7.1]. The evolution of industrial struc-
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Figure 8: UK Current Account Breakdown into Goods and Services 
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ture and the general equilibrium implications for factor prices are important 
research questions.
Two major themes emerge here. Firstly, some developed economies lead­
ing the globalisation process are also witnessing the deindustrialisation and 
offshoring of manufacturing activities, popularly known as “The Great Suck­
ing Sound”. The Anglo-Saxon economies have become some of the largest net 
importers of manufactured goods, giving rise to the fear of industrial hollowing 
out and job losses. As Richard E. Baldwin and Philippe Martin (1999) note, 
“The annual rate of de-industrialisation [of OECD countries] jumped sharply 
as globalisation picked up pace in the 1980s”40. On a smaller spatial scale, 
the loss of manufacturing for New York and London for example has been well
40 David Kucera and William Milberg (2002) estimate that trade expansion between OCED 
and non-OC'ED countries has resulted in the loss of 3.4 million manufacturing jobs in 10 
OECD countries between 1978 and 1990.
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documented [Peter Gripaios (1977); Robert Dennis (1978); Frank P. Romo 
and Michael Schwartz (1995)].
Secondly, there has been a marked increase in inequality as a result of the 
stagnation of blue-collar wages [John Bound and George Johnson (1992,1995); 
Baldwin and Martin (1999)]. More recently, even the offshoring of some white- 
collar jobs has become a source of concern. It has led some economists to point 
out the potential causal link between offshoring and wage stagnation [Robert 
C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson (1999)]. The link between trade, wages and 
income inequality is still contentious since many economists find skill-biased 
technological change to be the more plausible explanation of blue-collar wage 
stagnation. However, the hypothesis that globalisation has resulted in greater 
income inequality is still a source of keen academic and policy debate, partly 
because of the contemporaneous nature of de-industrialisation, offshoring, and 
blue-collar wage stagnation of developed economies.
The key questions remain: Why has so much manufacturing been offshored 
to developing countries in recent years? Why has the recent wave of globalisa­
tion been marked with blue-collar wage stagnation in developed countries and 
rising within nation inequality [Baldwin and Martin (1999)]? Can the “Shifts 
in Economic Geography?” [Anthony J, Venables (2006)] be the missing links 
that explain the contemporaneous occurrence of de-industrialisation and wage 
inequality?
Two Waves of G lobalisation The two waves mentioned in this paper 
have specific definitions41. In this paper, the first wave of globalisation is
41 The historical stylised facts of the two waves of globalisation are described in detail in 
Baldwin and Martin (1999).
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characterised by goods trade liberalisation. This can be interpreted as the 
lowering of tariffs for merchandise (manufactured) goods or a fall in shipping 
or freight costs42. The earlier rounds of General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT) contributed to the process of multilateral reduction in import 
tariffs. In this first globalisation wave, the services sector remained largely 
protected from foreign competition (i.e., high trade costs) by legal frameworks, 
regulations, language, or possibly even cultural and social norms. The exact 
nature of these costs will not be investigated in this paper.
Services here refer to a range of activities such as finance, banking, in­
surance, consulting, advertising, marketing, legal work that supply to global 
consumers and businesses [see the global city literature, Saskia Sassen (1991)]. 
These are the “advanced producer and financial services sectors that serve 
the command and control requirement of transnational capital” [Neil Brenner 
(1998)] - which in essence are activities that require a high skill content, as 
opposed to Balassa-Samuelson type of services like haircuts or plumbing.
In the second wave of globalisation, this paper assumes that services trade 
costs fall. There are several reasons why one should treat the liberalisation 
of services trade as a distinct process. The first explanation is due to tech­
nology. The sharp fall in telecommunication costs (as opposed to shipping 
costs for goods), digitisation of information, proliferation of the internet, are 
more recent phenomena compared to the first wave of globalisation. The fall 
in communication costs has opened up a whole range of services that can be 
carried out away from where production of goods takes place or where the
42Bairoch (1989) estimates that the 800-km shipment transport cost for iron goods as a 
percentage of production cost to be 27 per cent in 1830, 21 per cent in 1850, 10 per cent in 
1880, and 6 per cent in 1910. Shipping costs therefore had already fallen significantly prior 
to the First World War.
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consumers or downstream firms locate. Similarly, outsourcing of office back­
room services would not have been economical without the breakthrough in 
telecommunication technology. Secondly, many countries have also carried out 
internal reforms to liberalise their services industries (such as the Big Bang in 
London’s financial services sector), allowing a greater degree of market access 
by foreign firms. The expansion and deepening of the EU as a single market 
has also increased market access. Even the greater use of English as a busi­
ness language can be seen as a reduction of trade cost. These are all relatively 
recent phenomena compared to the earlier goods trade liberalisation.
Economic G eography in Two H istorical Episodes Why might it 
then be useful to consider trade liberalisation in two episodes? The conclusion 
of most NEG models is that economic activity can become unevenly spread - 
allowing a core and a periphery structure to develop [see Anthony J. Venables 
(2006) for an overview of theory and evidence]. When trade costs are high, 
production is dispersed in order to serve local markets that cannot otherwise 
be accessed through trade. When trade costs fall to an intermediate level, 
agglomeration can result. The salient point about these models is that below 
a certain level of trade cost (break point), the dispersion of economic activity 
will not be a stable equilibrium. As Krugman and Venables (1995) show with 
a horizontal linkages model, a small cost advantage in one location brought 
about by input-output linkages begets a greater cost advantage by attracting 
more firms, eventually leading to an outcome characterised by the “Inequality 
of Nations”. Stephen J. Redding and Venables (2004) empirically confirm the 
importance of market access and sources of supply in explaining variation in
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per capita income across countries. However, most NEG models do not make
any distinction between industries, and are generally silent on which industries 
actually agglomerate where43.
Following Masahisa Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)44, this paper 
assumes two differentiated industries (and one homogeneous industry). To 
help fix ideas, the two differentiated industries are called manufacturing and 
services respectively. The first main idea of this paper is that unlike the as­
sumption of many NEG models, trade costs for the two different industries 
do not fall symmetrically. Rather, this paper assumes that goods trade is lib­
eralised before services trade, thereby allowing manufacturing to agglomerate 
first.
The agglomeration of manufacturing firms gives rise to an endogenous com­
parative advantage in the sense that the cost of production (excluding wages) 
becomes relatively lower. Also, there exist input-output linkages between in­
dustries. As manufacturing agglomerates in one location, it also draws in 
services firms (without services being liberalised) simply because manufactur­
ing firms also buy services. This gives the manufacturing location a head- 
start in services even in the absence of services liberalisation. When services 
are finally liberalised, this head start becomes a lock-in cost of production 
advantage, making services firms agglomerate there as well, but potentially 
displacing manufacturing (or deindustrialisation) in the process45.
43Except for the distinction between homogeneous agriculture (or the numeraire sector) 
and the differentiated sector.
4 4 Henceforth known as FKV.
45A fore-runner to this paper is by Baldwin, Martin and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano (2001) 
- henceforth known as BMO - which shows that intermediate levels of trade costs may 
cause industries to agglomerate in the North, a result that is consistent with standard NEG 
predictions. But when the ‘cost of trading ideas’ falls (that is, greater global spillover of 
knowledge), it can result in the relative ‘deindustrialisation’ of the North, which in that 
exposition is simply the loss of industries (without being precise on what kind of industries
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Inequality  W ith in  N ations While inequality between nations is the 
result of early NEG models [Krugman and Venables (1995)], much of the 
recent debate, controversy about, and opposition to, globalisation is that it 
creates inequality within nations [Baldwin and Martin (1999)]. On an intu­
itive level, this is connected to the first theme - namely that manufacturing 
(including outsourcing of intermediate goods) has relocated from developed 
western economies to East Asia (first Japan, then the Asian Tigers and finally 
China) - and how this deindustrialisation has put blue-collar workers under 
downward wage pressures [Feenstra and Hanson (1999)]. Furthermore, Bren­
ner (1998) notes that social research into global cities has been dominated 
by some inter-related themes, including “deindustrialisation, . . , expansion 
and spatial concentration of financial and producer services industries, labour 
market-segmentation, . . . , socio-spatial polarisation.”
In summary, the contribution of this paper is to make use of what is already 
a standard NEG model and embed it with a multi-industries and multi-factors 
setup, in which globalisation influences the changes in industrial structure, 
eventually leading to both within and between nation inequality.
L im itations NEG models are not without their critics46. Firstly, many 
of the results stem from a specific functional form - namely CES preferences. 
Secondly, some results such as the home market effect depend on the simplify­
ing assumption that there is a homogeneous good (or sometimes known as agri­
are lost). Unlike BMO (2001), there is no accumulation of capital, no technology spillovers, 
no learning effects and no ‘cost of trading ideas’. Furthermore, this paper shows that the 
loss of manufacturing is not merely relative, but absolute. The second and distinct wave 
of globalisation can result in a shift in the endogenously determined comparative advantage 
- away from manufacturing and to services. As the North gains services firms, it can lose 
manufacturing firms in absolute terms.
46 Peter J. Neary (2000) provides an interesting exposition on the shortcoming of various 
NEG models.
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culture) that is competitively produced and costlessly traded to equalise the 
wage between two locations. Donald R. Davis (1998) shows that the costless 
trading assumption is not supported empirically, and that the home market 
effect disappears if one assumes trade costs to be the same for industrial and 
homogeneous goods. Thirdly, many NEG models make use of the simplifying 
assumption that consumption of the differentiated good is a small proportion 
of total income which ensures incomplete specialisation in equilibrium47. This 
assumes away any congestion cost that arises from agglomeration, leading to 
‘bang-bang’ predictions - that is, full agglomeration of all industries in one 
location or the other - that are not observed in reality. Finally, NEG models 
are often analytically intractable, particularly those with feedback loops, and 
are often only solved by numerical methods.
Many of the simplifying assumptions employed in many NEG models will 
also be used in this paper, and many of the criticisms will also apply. In 
particular, the model still relies on the agriculture good as the numeraire. 
It also relies on numerical solutions to illustrate the key points. In defence 
however, the model that this paper uses is one where input-output linkages 
drive the agglomeration process. Its conclusions therefore do not depend on 
the home market effect. In addition, as mentioned in the introduction, one 
of the objectives of this paper is to capture the displacement effect. This 
essentially is to move away from the ‘bang-bang’ predictions of many NEG 
models, thereby generating more realistic outcomes for industrial locations.
47 An alternate way of putting this is that the agricultural sector continues to operate in 
both regions to equalise wages. The monopolistic but atomistic firms in the industrial sector 
effectively face an infinite supply of labour at the given wage rate.
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4.2 M odel Setup
4.2.1 R egions
There are two regions in the model, North and South, subscripted by (j = 
N ,S ). There are three industries - the agricultural industry A  acting as the 
walrasian, costlessly transported, numeraire good, and two differentiated in­
dustries - manufacturing and services. Factors of production are immobile 
between the two regions.
4.2.2 A  Hierarchy o f Skills and Industries
There are three primary factors in the model - high-skilled (K ), semi-skilled 
(L) and unskilled labour (O). All workers are immobile between countries. 
There is a hierarchy of jobs that they can perform. High-skilled labour can 
work in all industries. Semi-skilled skilled workers can only work in manufac­
turing and agriculture; they are unproductive in services. Unskilled workers 
can only work in the agricultural industry, and are unproductive if used in the 
other two sectors. The skill level of a worker is therefore characterised by the 
range of tasks that he can perform. For example, a PhD can become equally 
productive as a farmer when he is deployed to a farm, but a farmer has zero 
productivity when deployed to a university. Succinctly put, a skilled worker 
is a perfect substitute for all workers with skills below him but an unskilled 
or semi-skilled worker is not a substitute for the worker type above him.
There are many reasons why this specification is attractive. Consider an 
alternative formulation where one allows the more productive worker a Ricar­
dian improvement in his productivity. In effect, this specification then becomes 
a unit of measure issue - that is, effective labour units. If worker K  is twice
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as productive as worker L, he simply becomes two times worker L and draws 
twice the wage. In a general equilibrium analysis, one just needs the knowl­
edge of effective labour units to pin down the market size. Furthermore, it 
also does not matter where each industry agglomerates. Within each location, 
the ratio of wages will just reflect the Ricardian productivity difference in any 
full employment equilibrium.
However, by reformulating the problem into one that has a hierarchy of 
jobs, the effective constraint placed on each industry becomes different. The 
lowest order industry - agriculture - has the highest potential pool of workers. 
The services industry, which can only use K-type workers, has the smallest 
potential pool of workers. The manufacturing industry is in between. When 
agglomeration takes place, different industries will have different effective con­
straints on their expansion. In NEG parlance, the congestion costs will be 
different for various industries, thereby resulting in different equilibrium wages 
where different industries agglomerate48.
To prevent any Hecksher-Ohlin motivation for trade, this paper assumes 
that both countries have the same endowments of unskilled, semi-skilled and 
skilled workers49
O n  =  O s  O  L n  =  L s  — L  K n  =  K s  =  K
48 The labour market need not be quite so dichotomous. For example, one can allow 
both manufacturing and services to use both skilled and semi-skilled workers, with services 
having a higher skill intensity compared to manufacturing. It is possible to create the 
same qualitative result. However, the choice of endowment will become more important in 
this alternative setup. For example, in the first wave of globalisation when manufacturing 
agglomerates, the wages for semi-skilled workers might rise above skilled workers since they 
are used more intensively, thereby presenting interpret at ional difficulties. With the setup 
presented in this paper, this anomaly will never arise since K-type workers are a perfect 
substitute for L-types but not the other way around. Less skilled workers will never receive 
more than their more skilled counterparts in any equilibrium configuration.
49 This will be relaxed later to highlight the effect of endowment on changes in industrial 
specialisation and wages.
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Even though both locations have exactly the same endowments, “comparative 
advantage” nevertheless arises in equilibrium because of the agglomeration 
process driven by the existence of input output linkages.
The characterisation of agricultural unskilled workers requires a little more 
explanation. In standard NEG models, workers are homogeneous. The pres­
ence of the agricultural sector in both regions, implied by a small consumption 
share of industrial goods, makes it easy to characterise the equilibrium. The 
agricultural sector simply serves as the buffer sector; any workers not used 
in industrial production are deployed in agriculture. Labour market clearing 
is achieved with great simplicity. The same mechanism is at work here with 
some modifications.
Effectively, the labour market works this way. If the supply of skilled 
labour is greater than the demand in services for it, the excess supply will 
be added to the manufacturing sector alongside the semi-skilled labour pool. 
Given the manufacturing sector labour demand for semi-skilled workers, the 
excess supply of semi-skilled workers will be used in the agricultural sector. 
Excess labour effectively cascades or overflows downwards. Unskilled labour, 
together with what is left from manufacturing and services, then becomes the 
buffer in the same way that the agricultural sector acts as the buffer in many 
NEG models.
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4.2.3 Consumer
(7 — 1
pr 
(7— 1 ( 7 - 1b5W
1
and X s  = f x Si d i
Each worker, regardless of type, maximises utility over all types of goods in a 
simple Quasi-linear utility50
U = A  +  hm In X m  +  /ig InX s  (48)
<7 
(J  — 1
where X m  = J di  f  x R° di are the CES aggregated 
manufacturing and services good respectively, and Hm  and measures the 
intensity of consumption of both sectors. Furthermore, X s  is aforementioned 
to be advanced producer services, it is reasonable to assume that fig < Hm  ~ 
in other words, a consumer lower direct purchases from this sector51.
From equation (48), the demands of each consumer for agriculture, manu­
facturing and services are given as follows
DA = w — ns  — nM Dm  = !P ^  Ds = %  (49)
where w is the wage, Pm and Ps are the CES aggregated prices. The coeffi­
cients are constrained fis +f^M < w so that there will be a positive consumption 
of the A good.
Within each differentiated sector, each consumer’s demands still take the
50The model works with a Cobb-Douglas utility function as well. In equilibrium, different 
worker types will be paid different wage rates. With Cobb-Douglas preferences, this implies 
that expenditures on each class of good is different for each type of worker. The Quasi-linear 
preferences allow us to ignore these income effect considerations. All workers, regardless of 
how much they are paid in equilibrium, will demand the same amount of Xm and Xs- Higher 
income translates to higher demand for the A good. The upshot of this is that there will 
not be any “home market effect” arising from consumer expenditure for the differentiated 
industries. All agglomeration is due to forward and backward linkages on the production 
side.
51 This assumption has no bearing on the qualitative pattern of results except to note that, 
if the intensity of demand for services is too high, the equilibrium will show dispersion of the 
services industry even at low levels of services trade costs since skilled workers are assumed 
to be evenly spread between the two locations.
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usual CES form
dM = P- ^ -  =  (50)
r M
In equilibrium, different worker types will potentially receive different wages 
due to the presence of agglomeration rents. But with the quasi-linear function, 
there are no income effects for the differentiated sectors. Therefore, following 
(50), the firm level demands become
= PJ0 ¥ -  i s  = p- 0  (51)
M
where p simply aggregates across the population of consumers (held as a con­
stant throughout), since all of them have the same expenditure on manufac­
turing and service.
4.2.4 Production Technology
Production in sector A  is standard - 1 worker to produce 1 unit of the good. 
Production in sectors M  and S  exhibits increasing returns to scale with a 
fixed cost /  and variable cost k . The cost function is homothetic, both fixed 
and variable costs use the factors in the same intensity. In addition, there are 
input-output linkages. For manufacturing, within or intra-industry linkages 
are captured by a m  and external or inter-industry linkages are captured by 
(3m . Intra-industry input-output linkages are assumed to be stronger than 
inter-industry input-output linkages. The labour share is =  1 — olm ~ Pm -
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The total cost function for M  type firm in country j  is therefore
CMj = (F + nxMj) (52)
Similarly, the cost function for firm S  firm in country j  becomes
Cth = iF + KxSi)v>]aPSfP&ies
where Pj is the CES aggregated price over all differentiated goods, k  is the 
per unit input requirement, and with 6m  and 6s simply the constants of cost 
minimisation52.
4.2.5 Trade Cost
Both manufacturing and services sectors face iceberg trade cost when export­
ing goods and services. However, in contrast to most Economic Geography 
models, this paper has elected to model different trade costs tm  and for 
manufacturing and services respectively. The reason behind this is to allow 
the globalisation process to occur as two distinct and separate processes for 
the two industries, roughly in keeping with the historical evidence.
The first wave of globalisation is captured by a decrease in tm  from some 
arbitrarily high levels, thus freeing up goods trade. While trade in goods 
becomes freer, trade in services is still not possible due to prohibitive trade 
barriers - high communication costs, language, legal, regulatory barriers - all 
captured by t s • The second wave of globalisation captures the effect of trade
52It is not necessary to assume that the linkages are symmetric between the two differen­
tiated industries. The input-output table (see Appendix) suggests they are not. However, 
in the numerical simulations later, the inter and intra-industry linkages are nevertheless 
assumed to be symmetric as this has no relevance for the qualitative result.
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liberalisation in services. Following standard notation, two freeness (phi-ness) 
of trade indices for the two sectors are defined as phi-M (<f)M = Tl^ a) and 
phi-S (05 =  T5_<j) respectively.
4.2.6 U nit Cost and Prices
The CES function gives the standard aggregated prices for the M  or S  sec­
tors, Pm  and Ps respectively (and with asterisk for the South). Given the 
description of the wages above, the unit cost functions can be written as
CM =  w l MP ^ MP%M6 u  c h  =  w ^ MP ^ Mp f Me M  (53)
a s  =  w ] ? P g s p f c e s  c-s  =  w ' ^ P ’s ° s p ^ 0 s
Therefore, the unit cost functions depend not only on the aggregate prices, 
but also the kind of wages faced by each industry (which may no longer be 
1 for every worker everywhere). The wage of semi-skilled and skilled workers 
wl and w k , together with the counterparts in the South w*L and w*K , will 
be endogenised in equilibrium. Their values will depend on the patterns of 
agglomeration that emerge.
4.2 .7  Profits
The profit function of each manufacturing firm in the North can be written as
1 (  & °  \  Mm +  q m R m  +  P s R s  , x
nM = a { ^ 1 KCM)  \ ------------P ^ ------------ +  ^
Mm +  aM R*m  +  PsR*s
p *  l —a  
M
(54)
- cmF
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where Rm  and R s  are North’s aggregate intermediate purchases by the man­
ufacturing and services sector respectively (to be defined later). Hence, the 
manufacturing firm charges an optimal price of kcmj which is a constant 
mark up over its unit cost. The terms inside the curly brackets provide the 
total market potential perceived by the firm from home sales (first term) and 
export sales (second term). The fixed cost is given by cmF. Since the two 
locations have the same population size, p,M = J1*M. Similarly for the services 
industry, the profit function can be written as
1 (  g 1  ^ f  Ms +  asR s  +  Pm R m ,
* a  =  *  l ^ r KCsJ \  j f ?  +  * s
Ms +  &sR*s +  (3 M&M
P *  1—cr
^S
If more manufacturing firms locate to the North, the market potential in 
the North increases relative to that in the South because of the presence 
of backward linkages. There will be more firms at the same location that 
demand its products as intermediates. At the same time, because of the intra­
industry linkages, the unit cost in the North will fall relative to that in the 
South (forward linkages) since the intermediates are no longer subjected to 
trade costs.
In the South, the profit functions are exactly analogous and are given by
—csF
*s =  -
<7
<7 V cr — 1 k c m
1—cr
4>m
Mm F  a M R m  +  P s R s
p i  —cr 
M
+ Mm +  a M  R*m  + PsR*sp *  1—cr 
M
- cmF
cr — 1 kcs
1—cr
<l>s
Ms + asRs + PmRm
p i —crr s
+
(55)
Ps + asRs + Pm R*M
>*1—cr -c*s F
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Some N orm alisations To simplify the notations, the paper makes a few 
convenient normalisations [see Economic Geography & Public Policy by Bald­
win et al]. Firstly, k =  thereby simplifying the cost of each unit to 1. 
Secondly, F  = Take for example a profit function in equation (54). By 
using these normalisations, the profit function can be written as
7TM =  —CM •! Cj J
Vm  +  +  PsFs , (  Mm + aMR*M +  PsF-s
+  4>mp i —cr t M I p * l  — cr
M  \  M
- 1
where the terms inside the curly brackets represent output given the CES pref­
erence. Given these two normalisations, the paper makes use of the standard 
result that the production scale consistent with zero-profit is
x = 1
This greatly reduces the notations and also simplifies later numerical analysis. 
Note that in equilibrium, the total input requirement of each firm is given as 
( x k , + /) ,  which because of the above normalisation is also equal to 1. Each 
firm therefore will demand one physical unit of input in equilibrium.
4.2.8 W orkers’ Types and  E quilibrium  W age R ates
The price of good A  is chosen as the numeraire. Since unskilled workers are 
immobile to other industries, the agricultural sector must operate in both 
countries, thereby pinning down low-skilled wages as wo =  1. If all if-type 
workers are employed in the S  sector, then wk ^  wl in equilibrium. Other­
wise, if-type workers would be better off in the manufacturing sector, and the
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labour market cannot be in equilibrium. Writing these explicitly
wK = <
wK
wL
K dN =  K N 
K dN < K n
(56)
where wk indicates the equilibrium wage and K fj is the conditional demand
for skilled labour in the North. This is given by
which is simply the demand per services firm multiplied by the number of 
services firms in the North 715 since each firm demands 1 unit of input given the 
normalisation. Equation (57) is therefore the total derived demand for skilled 
labour given the number of firms operating in that particular location53.
In equilibrium, it is possible that not all If-type workers will work in 
services (K n  — K fj > 0 ). In that case, those If-type workers not employed in 
services will choose to work in manufacturing and be offered wage w l . The 
wage function of wl becomes
w l = <
WL L% = Ln +  (K n  -  Kff)
wo = 1 Otherwise
where conditional demand for manufacturing labour is given as
(58)
1m_ Y m ( ? m Y m ( M  
Pm )  \ wl )  \ w l )
Pm
tim (59)
53Off equilibrium, if conditional demand is larger than supply of factor K% > Kn,  wage 
wk has to increase until the equilibrium value wk solves for K% = Kn- If conditional 
demand is not larger than the supply at that location, wk must fall to that of the next skill 
tier w l -
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and tim is the number of manufacturing firms in the North54. The same set 
of equations for w*K and w*L can also be written for the South analogously, 
providing a total of four wage equations.
The above equations also give a sense on why an analytical solution might 
prove difficult. The wage functions are non-differentiable as they are discontin­
uous at the point at which the supply constraint binds. In contrast, the wage 
rate is determined by the price of the agricultural good in an equilibrium 
characterised by incomplete specialisation. As can be seen from the above 
equations, wages are a function of local conditional demands (which depend 
on the number of firms at each location), which is also a function of wages. 
The mapping of wages onto firms and then back onto wages makes it difficult 
to solve this problem analytically55.
4.2.9 D efinition o f Interm ediate Revenues and Total W age
Intermediate revenues are given in a standard way, simply the total cost of all 
firms. The intermediate revenues for North and South manufacturing are
R m  = timcm(kx +  F) R*M =  n*Mc*M(Kx +  F) (60)
Similarly, the intermediate revenues for North and South services are
R s — rises ( k x  +  F) Rg =  n*s Cg(Kx  +  F )
54 Again, in an off equilibrium situation where L% ^ L n  +  ( K n  — K%), then w l  must 
increase until the equilibrium value u)l solves for L% = Ln +  (Kn — Kn). If L% < Ln +  
( K n  — Kfj), then wl will take the value of 1 since some semi-skilled workers will work in 
the agricultural sector.
55The wage functions are also non-differentiable.
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Total incomes (which are equal to expenditures) are given by
E  =  w k K n  +  w l L n  +  O n E* =  w *kK s  +  w *lL s  +  Os  (61)
With these, agriculture demands are given by
A* — E* — \lm ~
With the quasi-linear preferences, only the demand for agriculture is affected 
by changes in wage incomes.
4 .3  S o lv in g  for E q u ilib r iu m
4.3.1 Equilibrium C onditions
Typically in a NEG model, the number of firms is fixed in the short-run 
while other endogenous variables adjust. In the long run, all the conditions of 
the short-run equilibrium are met while allowing the free entry conditions 
(firms’ entry and exit) to be satisfied. But since this paper is concerned 
with the long-run evolution of industrial locations and factor returns over 
two episodes of globalisation, it makes no distinction between the short and 
long-run solution. Instead, all variables are allowed to adjust towards the 
long-run equilibrium from the onset for every level of given trade costs. The 
equilibrium is characterised by a vector of eight endogenous variables { t i m , 
nM> n<S> nS'> wLi Wki wl }  are pinned down by the four zero-profit 
conditions and four wage equations such that:
(a) all firms make zero profits given entry, exit and relocation and;
(b) goods markets clear and;
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(c) there is no excess demand or supply for skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled 
labour given the equilibrium wages in both locations.
4.3.2 A djustm ent Process
Given a specific level of trade costs, the numerical solutions begin by imposing 
a symmetric (arbitrary) number of firms to both locations. A small positive 
shock (sp =  0 .01) to the number of manufacturing firms is given to one lo­
cation, and a small negative shock (—£f) is applied to another, to break the 
initial symmetry.
Step 1 Firms are allowed to enter, exit or relocate. If both North and 
South firms have positive profits given the number of existing firms, a small 
increment ( + £ f )  in the number of firms is further applied to both locations - 
this is entry. If both North and South firms continue to have negative profits, 
a small decrease (—£f) in the number of firms is applied due to exit. If the 
North has higher profits than the South, firms migrate northwards ( + £ f  for 
the North and — £p for the South) for relocation. Vice versa.
Step 2 Local labour markets adjust. Given the interim number of firms in 
both North and South after the step 1 adjustments, the demand for labour for 
the industry for each location can be derived using the cost minimising demand 
function [see equations (57) and (59)]. If demand for skilled labour from 
services exceeds supply at a particular location, the local skilled wages will 
move upwards in a small increment (ew — 0.0001)56. If not, the excess skilled 
labour is added to the local pool of semi-skilled labour or downward cascading.
56 The adjustment parameters £f and £w represent a search increment of a magnitude 
that is one-hunclredth of a per cent of the underlying variables.
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Again, the demand for labour from manufacturing is checked against this 
pool. If demand exceeds supply, even the semi-skilled wage moves upwards 
(also bumping up skilled wages in the process since skilled wages cannot be 
lower than semi-skilled labour in equilibrium). Otherwise, any excess overflows 
into the unskilled labour pool too, which then serves the numeraire sector 
agriculture.
Ite ra tio n  Steps 1 and 2 are iterated until the equilibrium conditions stated 
are met. This will then give the long-run number of firms and wages in each 
location.
4.3.3 M odel P aram eters
The key parameters in this model are the intra and inter-industry linkages as 
they determine the strength of the agglomeration forces as well as the wages 
in equilibrium. In a two-sector setup, it is necessary that the intra-industry 
linkages are stronger than inter-industry ones for agglomeration to take place. 
Otherwise, both industries will tend to disperse rather than agglomerate since 
the benefits of co-location with another industry is greater than each industry 
locating in one location [see FKV for further exposition]. The input-output 
table provides strong evidence that intra-industry linkages are indeed stronger 
[see Appendix C:4.7.2]57.
57In the numerical simulations, this paper assumes the intra- and inter-industry linkages of 
both sectors to be symmetric. Though the 10 table suggests that they are slightly different, 
it does not change the results qualitatively, so long as intra-industry linkages are stronger.
133
4.4 Results
4.4.1 A utarky  R esults
Economic activity is completely dispersed in the autarky equilibrium. All 
labour types have the same wage, equal to the numeraire. This is due to the 
fact that the paper has chosen factor endowment such that factor supplies of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers exceed the demands for them in the absence 
of agglomeration. Since prices are also the same in both locations given the 
symmetry of the regions, real wages are also equal. There is no inequality 
between or within nations.
4.4.2 F irst W ave of G lobalisation
In the first wave of globalisation, trade costs in services are kept arbitrar­
ily high such that (j>s = 0 (no services trade is possible). In the numerical 
solutions, the trade cost for manufacturing is gradually lowered (increase in 
phi-M). Two sets of equilibrium paths are possible - one with greater a concen­
tration of both manufacturing and services in the North (shares greater than 
0.5) and the other with a greater concentration in the South. This can be 
seen in Figure 9, where the Y-axis shows the share of firms for each industry 
located in the North plotted against phi-M (X-axis).
W age-sustain and  W age-break Poin ts The definitions of break and sus­
tain points are slightly different from traditional NEG models since the pa­
rameters and endowments are chosen so agglomeration will result in the rise 
of wages due to the limited endowments. In a symmetric equilibrium, both 
locations have exactly the same number of services and manufacturing firms,
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and wages everywhere for all types of workers will be the numeraire wage 
(wK = w*K = wL = w*L =  1).
In order to make a distinction between the break/sustain point as used in 
the standard NEG literature, this paper introduces the “wage-break or wage- 
sustain points”58. The wage-break point is defined as the level of trade cost 
(which can be equivalently expressed in terms of trade freeness) that allows 
wage symmetry between the types of labour within a location to be broken. 
The wage-sustain point is the level of trade cost that allows a wage differential 
between the types of labour to be sustained in a location.
For example, the manufacturing wage-break point is the level of trade 
freeness 4>m  which allows the symmetric distribution of manufacturing to break 
in favour of one location, resulting in a premium on manufacturing wages in 
that location. Similarly, the manufacturing “wage-sustain point” is the level 
of trade freeness that allows manufacturing wages to be sustained at a 
higher level, with the maximum level of agglomeration as the initial condition.
Tom ahawk D iagram  The tomahawk diagram plots the shares of firms of 
the North (South’s shares axe simply the complement) on the Y-axis against 
the level of trade freedom phi-M on the X-axis. The firm share diagram is a 
‘multiple pitchfork’ as there is more than one industry. The wage-break and 
wage-sustained points can be clearly seen in the Figure 959.
58 In the standard NEG literature, the break point is the value of trade costs at which 
the symmetric equilibrium with equal shares of industry between two locations becomes 
unstable. The sustain point is the value of trade costs at which the asymmetric equilibrium 
(with agglomeration) can be sustained.
59 As standard in NEG models, the sustain point comes before the break point since the 
value of trade costs at which the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable is lower (or phi-ness 
higher) than the value of trade costs at which the asymmetric equilibrium (agglomeration) 
can be sustained. There is a region of overlap between the two (see and in Figure 
9) where both the agglomeration or symmetric equilibrium are stable, depending on the 
initial conditions. Because of the possibility of multiple equilibria in this region of overlap,
135
Figure 9: Tomahawk Diagram (First Wave)
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The outer pitchfork lines (in solid blue) show the equilibrium shares of man­
ufacturing while the inner pitchfork shows the equilibrium shares of services 
(in dotted red). Though there is no services trade, its shares are influenced 
by the shares of manufacturing as a result of the inter-industry linkages, as 
shown in the inner pitchforks. Since supply of skilled and semi-skilled labour 
is finite and wages increase when these constraints are reached, the pitchfork 
lines represent the maximum shares that do not reach 1 or 0. In other words, 
the equilibrium does not exhibit a ‘bang-bang’ outcome.
The level of endowments relative to the size of consumption will determine 
how much agglomeration can take place. For example, given a constant con-
expectations become important since some firms may shift location in anticipation that this 
will change the initial conditions enough to trigger agglomeration. To keep exposition simple, 
this paper ignores the role of expectation.
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sumption intensity in the preferences, a symmetric increase in the endowment 
of if-type labour in both the North and South will widen the pitchforks by 
allowing more agglomeration to take place before resource constraints start to 
bind.
A gglom eration R ents When the labour resource limits are reached, labour 
begins to earn agglomeration rents. For example, when manufacturing ag­
glomerates in one location and exhausts the pool of skilled and semi-skilled 
labour, entry firms bid up the equilibrium wages according to equations (56) 
and (58). The evolution of wages is given in Figure 10. As a result of manu­
facturing agglomeration, skilled and semi-skilled workers begin to command a 
wage premium over unskilled workers (whose wage is set to 1). The standard 
hump-shape feature of the equilibrium wage path is that inequality is high­
est at intermediate levels of merchandise trade costs - rising quickly after the 
wage-sustain point <pfj and falling gradually as trade cost falls further.
From the wage break point 0 ^ , there is a small discrete jump in the wages 
as the symmetric equilibrium is broken. In this first wave, the change in wage 
structure is driven by the agglomeration of manufacturing. As manufacturing 
uses both K  and L types, the agglomeration rent is shared between these two 
types of workers. This also implies that services demand for skilled workers 
does not exhaust the supply of all skilled workers, and some of them are 
employed in the manufacturing sector in equilibrium.
4.4.3 Second Wave of G lobalisation
Goods trade costs are held at a constant level (<f>M — 0.7 or tm  = 1.10). 
Given this level of (f>M, the paper solves for the long-run equilibrium when
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Figure 10: North’s Equilibrium Wages (First Wave) 
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services trade becomes free (from (J)S =  0 to 1). The services “wage-break 
point” is the level of services trade cost, below which services reaches maximum 
agglomeration and exhausts the sector specific factor. In other words, the 
services wage-break point is reached when K  type wages become higher than 
L type wages (w k  > w l  o t  w *k >  w *l ) .
In order to reduce the number of possible equilibrium development paths 
and to simplify the exposition, the paper shows only one set of equilibrium 
paths for the second wave of globalisation - one that assumes that the North 
has a larger share of manufacturing in the first wave. This is broadly consistent 
with the historical pattern since the Industrial Revolution. The fact that trade 
costs fall sequentially (goods first then services) becomes important here. The 
key thing to note is that even though services is not liberalised in the first
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wave, the North has an initial advantage in services. From an arbitrarily high 
level of trade costs, services trade becomes freer (moving right on the X-axis 
in Figure 11).
Figure 11: Tomahawk Diagram (Second Wave) North 
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As services trade is freed, services sector firms begin to agglomerate in the 
North quickly as a result of the initial advantage (see Figure 11). As skilled 
workers begin to migrate away from manufacturing and into services, there 
is a contraction of manufacturing activities in the North, relocated to the 
South. The wage-break point occurs at around (f>s =  0.2 (this can be related 
to Figure 12, at the same (/>$ where wk becomes higher than wl). There is 
location hysteresis, but only for the services sector. Since this is a model with 
horizontal linkages, the relocation of manufacturing activities to the South 
effectively becomes offshoring since firms in the North will use a greater share
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of intermediates produced in the South (pseudo-offshoring).
When services trade becomes very liberalised at around (f>s — 0.8 (Fig­
ure 11), the North experiences a precipitous loss of manufacturing or large 
scale deindustrialisation. This discontinuity occurs because of the following 
reason. When services trade is initially liberalised, the presence of a large ser­
vices sector agglomerating in the North offers manufacturing firms lower cost 
of production, since manufacturing firms also demand services intermediates. 
The inter-industry forward linkages induce a sizeable number of manufacturers 
to maintain their presence in the North at intermediate levels of services trade 
liberalisation (from (f)S values of 0.2 to 0.8). However, further liberalisation of 
services can bring the equilibrium into a tipping point when even the South 
can access services intermediates from the North cheaply. North’s advantage 
in cheaper services intermediates becomes outweighed by the cheaper labour in 
the South (which is w*L =  1). As a manufacturing firm relocates to the South 
to take advantage of the cheaper cost of labour there, it further reinforces the 
attraction of the South through intra-industry input-output linkages. Because 
of this process of cumulative causation, more manufacturing firms relocate to 
the South until equilibrium is restored60. The key point is that the advantage 
Northern manufacturers have in terms of lower services intermediates cost is 
no longer enough to sustain a large number of manufacturers in the North at 
low levels of services trade cost. This is an interesting result since the loss of 
manufacturing or deindustrialisation in the North is not triggered by greater 
goods trade liberalisation ((f)M is kept constant in this set of results). Services
60 In equilibrium, there will still be some manufacturing firms in the North. The presence 
of a large number of services firms means that there will still be demand for manufacturing 
intermediates.
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trade liberalisation alone can trigger the deindustrialisation process.
The evolution of equilibrium wages is given in Figure 12. Trade costs are 
falling from the left to the right of the diagram. The boundary line at around 
4>s = 0 .2 , representing the services wage-break point, is the point where all 
skilled workers become fully employed in services. To the right of this point, 
skilled workers begin to earn a premium w k > wl- The biggest difference 
between w k  and w l occurs at intermediate levels of rs  (around 4>$ = 0.43 or 
t  s  = 1-23).
Figure 12: Equilibrium Wages (Second Wave) North 
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At around (f>s = 0.8 when the North suffers from a precipitous loss of 
manufacturing, K  type workers in the North experience a wage spike. Con­
sider what happens at this point. North’s manufacturing sector has become 
so small that w i becomes 1. In other words, some L type workers are reduced
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to working in agriculture, earning the same wage as O type workers. Much 
of manufacturing intermediates are now mainly imported from the South and 
they are subjected to trade cost. Due to the sudden relocation of manufactur­
ing to the South, the CES price aggregate for manufacturing increases sharply 
in the North. Firms in the services sector demand three types of inputs - 
if-type workers, services intermediates and manufacturing intermediates. As 
the cost of manufacturing intermediates increases, firms substitute away from 
the last source of input towards the previous two. The effect of this is that 
wk will rise sharply to restore equilibrium in the factor market.
4 .5  F actor R esp o n ses  an d  C h an ges in  E n d ow m en ts
International trade can be driven by inherent differences between countries 
giving rise to comparative advantage or by increasing returns to scale. Yet 
surprisingly little is known of the relative importance between the two ex­
cept for the study by Davis and David E. Weinstein (1999). In this model, 
relative factor abundance (skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled workers) may deter­
mine where industries locate, but not necessarily so. If a region is relatively 
abundant in skilled labour, one would naturally expect that region to have 
a comparative advantage in the production of services. However, the overall 
cost of production depends on intermediate inputs as well as labour. The cost 
of intermediates in turn depends on the number of firms located in the region 
and the level of trade freedom. Comparative advantage therefore is not only 
due to the relative factor abundance but also the accidents of history - which 
industry agglomerates where first.
Davis and Weinstein (1999) find evidence that Economic Geography (or
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increasing returns as a motivation for trade) operates at a subnational scale 
but not for international trade which is still largely dominated by compara­
tive advantage. However, as agglomeration of an industry often gives rise to 
economic rent, it is also possible that the composition of local factors begin to 
change in response to the agglomeration rent. Therefore, to the extent that 
factors shift endogenously in response to the kind of industries that agglom­
erate, there may in fact be more Economic Geography at work than evidence 
suggests. In a limited way, the next subsection discusses the endogeneity of 
Economic Geography and endowment-driven comparative advantage.
4.5.1 Comparisons w ith  N eoclassical Theories
Consider the following thought experiment. K -type workers in the North earn 
a premium over L-types if services trade is sufficiently liberalised. Suppose 
there is an increase in K -type workers relative to L-types, what will happen to 
industrial locations and wages61 ? In this set of numerical solutions, the number 
of LT-type workers in the North is increased by 10 units (or 10 per cent increase 
from baseline) and the number of L type workers is correspondingly decreased 
by 10 units (10 per cent decrease). For the world as a whole, this implies 
an increase in the number of LT-type workers (by 5 per cent from baseline) 
and decrease in the number of L-types (by 5 per cent). The resulting industry 
shares are presented in Figure 13, which one can compare to Figure 11 showing 
the shares before the changes in endowment occur.
61 One can think of the increase in if-types workers to arise from a process of skill ac­
quisition, where the L-type workers acquire skills in response to the higher wages (or ag­
glomeration rent) in the services sector. This paper does not model the dynamics of skills 
acquisition. Instead, the initial endowment is changed to reflect the acquisition of skills and 
a comparative static analysis is carried out.
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Figure 13: Tomahawk Diagram (Second Wave) with K Type Increase in North 
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As more semi-skilled workers become skilled, this further expands the ser­
vices sector in the North by facilitating more services agglomeration. Com­
pared to Figure 11, the comparative static shows that the share of North’s 
manufacturing is even lower now at every level of services trade cost. To­
gether, these present a quasi-Rybczynski effect, that is the expansion of the 
sector that uses the increased factor and a contraction of the other sector. 
Since inter-industry linkages are stronger than intra-industry ones, the cost of 
intermediates for manufacturing rises while that for services falls.
In equilibrium, it is possible that wk rises even more, even though there
Figure 14: Equilibrium North Wages with Increase in K
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This can be seen by comparing the wages shown in Figure 14 to that of Figure 
12, without the increase in Zv-types. This is different from the prediction of 
neoclassical theories where one would expect the increase in a factor relative 
to another to either lead to decrease in relative wage (for a large country) or 
to have no effect at all (for a small country).
To draw the link between globalisation and developed economies’ blue- 
collar wage decrease under the neoclassical model, economists have to demon­
strate the price effect - that is, how trade liberalisation has reduced the relative 
price of goods which use blue-collar workers intensively [Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999)]. Simply put, the terms of trade have to move against a sector in order 
to account for the fall in the relative return of the factor used intensively in 
that sector in any neoclassical setting. This is simply a restatement of the
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Stolpher-Samuelson theorem.
With increasing returns, input-output linkages and Economic Geography, 
this paper shows that a non-standard, or even surprising result, can emerge. 
The increase in the number of K -type workers in the North has led to a relative 
decrease in the (aggregated) price of services, yet this is accompanied by an 
increase in the returns to workers employed in that sector. In other words, 
the further agglomeration of services in the North results in the worsening 
of terms of trade or price effects, but at the same time leads to the relative 
increase in the factor return to skilled workers used in that sector. This is 
in sharp contrast to the Stolper-Samuelson prediction. The wage ratio, or 
relative wage, between skilled and unskilled becomes higher.
4.5.2 Offshoring and W ages
More recently, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2006), after fur­
ther slicing the production of goods into a continuum of tasks, also show that 
offshoring of low-skilled work does not depress low-skilled wages if there are 
no terms of trade effects (such as in the case of a small country). In fact, 
offshoring of low-skilled work could increase low-skilled wages due to the pro­
ductivity effect (or if the productivity effect is stronger than the terms of 
trade effect). However, the authors’ framework is still very much neoclassical 
in nature.
In this paper with increasing returns to scale and input-output linkages, the 
prediction is again different. As more and more manufacturing firms migrate 
to the South, the sector becomes effectively offshored and intermediates have 
to be imported from the South. This represents a loss of intra-industry forward
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linkages, leading to an absolute decline in wl in order to restore the equilibrium 
[see Figures 10 and 12]. By considering the effects forward linkages have on 
equilibrium wages, the conclusion about offshoring becomes less favourable for 
the less-skilled workers.
4.5.3 W orsening Inequality in the N orth
The upshot of all this is that the increase in skilled workers endowment in the 
North may worsen rather than ameliorate income inequality there. Indeed, 
Bound and Johnson (1995) point out that “One of the major puzzles about 
the wage structure during the 1980s [for the US] is why the returns to observed 
skills (education and experience) rose while the labour force has become more 
educated and older.” There is indeed much evidence suggesting that skill- 
biased technology change can to a large extent explain this puzzle. However, 
skill-biased technological change does not account for one of the key stylised 
facts of the recent wave of globalisation, which is the deindustrialisation of 
many OECD countries.
Furthermore, Feenstra (1998) notes that “we should not assess the prox­
imate cause of the decline in employment and wage of unskilled workers by 
attributing all within-industry shifts in labour to technology, and allowing 
trade to operate only via between industry shifts . . .  as soon as trade in 
intermediates is permitted, as with outsourcing, then the changes in demand 
for labour within industry can occur due to trade as well. In fact, the whole 
distinction between ‘trade’ and ‘technology’ becomes suspect when we think 
of corporations shifting activities overseas.”
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4.5.4 Wage Inequality in the South
In the various sets of numerical solutions shown thus far, wage inequality 
appears only for the North. However, with a suitable choice of parameters, it 
is possible to show that inequality also arises in the South. The concentration 
of manufacturing in the South in the second wave of globalisation can lead to 
skilled and semi-skilled workers earning a wage premium above their unskilled 
counterparts (exactly the same process that occurred in the North during the 
first wave)63. Figure ?? is the South’s counterpart to Figure 12. As trade costs 
fall from the left to the right of the diagram, it shows the effect of South’s 
skilled and semi-skilled wages when manufacturing agglomerates in the second 
wave64. At around 4>g = 0.8 (when manufacturing shifts dramatically to the 
South), there is an increase in the skilled and semi-skilled wages in the South 
over their unskilled counterparts. Again, note that this is entirely triggered by 
services trade liberalisation, which displaces manufacturing from the North. 
What began as sharp inequality between nations can end up becoming sharp 
inequality within nations.
4 .6  C on clu sion
NEG models often rely on some simplifying assumptions, for example the 
presence of a homogeneous and costlessly traded good that equalises wages 
everywhere. In addition, due to the feedback mechanism in many NEG mod­
els, full analytical solutions are sometimes not possible. In its place, numerical
63 Some economists have noted that inequality in developing countries can arise since the 
production that is offshored from developed countries allows the skilled workers in the de­
veloping countries to earn a wage premium above the rest of the population.
64 An example of such a situation would be the income disparity between the urbanised 
manufacturing workers and the rural farmers in China.
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Figure 15: Skilled and Semi-Skilled Wages in South (Second Wave)
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solutions are often used to derive the economic understanding. In this paper, 
the tractability problem faced by a standard NEG model is made even more 
complicated with labour market segmentation, adjustments and wage dynam­
ics. Furthermore, agglomeration forces operate in two different channels (inter 
and intra-industry) asymmetrically for given values of trade costs. Because 
of these complexities, only numerical solutions are provided. Naturally, nu­
merical solutions have to be interpreted with a degree of caution. The results 
often change with parameter specifications. Without a full analytical solution, 
it is sometimes difficult to tell if the results are general enough for them to be 
plausible explanations of reality, a point this paper concedes. The advantage 
of numerical solution however is that it shows the rich equilibrium paths of lo­
cations and wages that can emerge in the model, and allows one to understand
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the complex dynamics of the globalisation process.
The contribution of this paper is that it reconciles several key stylised facts 
within a single Economic Geography framework. The story runs as follows. 
The improvement of communication technology in the recent wave of glob­
alisation brings about a change in the specialisation of developed economies 
by allowing greater services agglomeration from their position of initial ad­
vantage in the first wave. Firstly, it results in a loss of workers from North’s 
manufacturing sector due to competition for skilled workers. Secondly, greater 
services trade liberalisation results in the loss of forward linkages for North’s 
manufacturing firms by allowing South’s manufacturing sector to access ser­
vices inputs cheaply. If services trade is free enough (such as in 4>s — 0.8 in 
Figure 11), this can trigger a precipitous shift of manufacturing to the South 
or deindustrialisation (which implies greater offshoring). The loss of employ­
ment and forward linkages in North’s manufacturing sector then reduces the 
wage of semi-skilled workers in the North. The increase in skilled labour in 
the North further accentuates this process and results in even greater inequal­
ity. By explicitly modelling the agglomeration process with labour markets 
constraints, and treating the globalisation process as two distinct waves, this 
paper shows how the shifts in economic geography can explain many stylised 
facts.This paper therefore provides a stylised understanding of the history of 
North-South industrial development and the patterns of trade.
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4.7 Appendix C
4.7.1 P a tte rn s  of Specialisation in M ajor Developed and Develop­
ing Economies
Table 10: Current Account Balances (US Millions) of Goods (Top) and Ser­
vices (Bottom) of Major OECD and Emerging Economies
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Countries with persistent goods deficits and services surpluses are: India, 
Spain, UK and United States. Countries with persistent goods surpluses and 
services deficits are: China, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Russia. 
Countries with persistent goods surpluses: Netherlands. Countries with per­
sistent services surpluses: France.
4.7.2 Model Parameters
In tra  and  In te r-in d u stry  Linkages The 1998 UK Input-Output Table 
with a total of 40 sectors covering both goods and services is used as a reference 
for parameter choice. The first 6 sectors spanning mostly primary products - 
agriculture, mining, food and tobacco, textile, wood, paper - are dropped. The 
utility sectors like construction and power generation are also dropped since 
they are infrastructural in nature (sectors 25-26). Services sectors that are 
mostly domestically oriented like hotels and restaurants (sector 28), real estate 
(sector 32), public administration and security (sector 37) are also dropped.
Of the remaining, sectors 7 to 24, spanning all industrial manufactured 
goods are taken as a whole to be the goods cluster. Sectors 27 to 40, spanning 
a whole range of services including wholesale and retail, finance, insurance, 
research and development, post & telecommunication, transport &; storage 
and business services are considered as a whole to be the services cluster.
Ignoring the effects of production taxes, this paper checks for the intra- 
and inter-cluster linkages, taking the two broad clusters as defined. Checking 
the within and between cluster demands for intermediates, the goods cluster’s 
inter and intra-industry linkages are 0.40 and 0.21 respectively. For the services 
cluster, the corresponding numbers are 0.43 and 0.06.
Instead of using cluster aggregate demands for intermediates, another mea­
sure would be to use the average intermediate demands of all defined sectors 
within the specified cluster. Taking the average for sectors in the goods clus­
ter, the inter-industry and intra-industry linkages then become 0.44 and 0.24 
respectively. Taking the average for sectors in the services cluster, the corre­
sponding numbers are 0.50 and 0.07. The evidence therefore points to stronger
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inter-industry input-output linkages.
E lasticity  David Hummels (1999) estimates that the elasticities of most 
goods are in the range of 3 to 8 , with an average of 5.6. This implies an 
average mark-up of 22 per cent. This paper rounds down the elasticity to 5 
for both services and manufacturing sectors, implying a mark-up of 25 per 
cent.
C onsum ption In tensities The consumption intensities for manufacturing 
and services are given as 0.4 and 0.2 respectively. The choice of parameters 
here have no bearing on the qualitative results except to note that they must 
be large enough (relative to endowments) so that one location cannot hold all 
firms. This is to ensure that the endowment constraints are binding enough 
to generate wage increases in equilibrium.
Sum m ary The numerical solution is carried out using MATLAB. The base­
line parameters are provided in the table below.
Table 11: Baseline Parameters for Numerical Solutions
Endowments £IIII
£
1005IICOII$ 100
Industry Linkages OtM 0.40
Pm 0.10
a s 0.40
Ps 0.10
Elasticities G 5
Mm 0.40
V s 0.20
Adjustment /  Increment £ p 0.01
£ W 0.0001
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5 F inal C onclusion
While there is some broad agreement amongst mainstream economists of the 
benefits of globalisation, there is also a growing consensus that it is perhaps 
less useful to paint the process of globalisation in broad brush strokes. Glob­
alisation is a complicated and multifaceted process. At the very least, it 
does create winners and losers, within and between nations. Judged by the 
strength of the anti-globalisation movement, the process of globalisation must 
have created real anxieties and increased insecurities, if not resulting in out­
right displacement. A key objective of research must therefore be to uncover 
the positive and normative aspects of globalisation and to address some of 
these concerns where possible.
Globalisation has not one, but many strands of narrative and research. 
While pointing to the gains of globalisation, new research suggests that glob­
alisation works through many channels. The “new breed of models paint 
globalisation with a much finer brush.”65 - the effects on sectors, on firms, 
within firms and on different segments of society. With this over-arching view 
in mind, this thesis has highlighted three aspects of globalisation with three 
models.
The first model points to a key benefit of greater trade integration. In a 
monopolistically competitive, differentiated industry characterised by firm- 
heterogeneity and business cycle shocks, trade liberalisation can result in 
greater stability for price and output by allowing the productivity cutoffs to 
be equalised across economies. The greater stability then translates into di­
65The Economist, “The Great Unbundling”, January 2007.
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rect welfare gains for the risk-averse consumers. More pertinently, the result 
is not sensitive to the distribution of income. Greater price-output stability 
benefits all consumers and no one becomes worse off as a result of greater 
trade liberalisation. The model therefore presents a strong pro-globalisation 
argument.
The second model presents an Economic Geography environment with mo­
bile capital, immobile workers, and productively heterogeneous firms. The re­
sults show that a small improvement in a location’s productivity distribution 
(in terms of a rightward shift of the distribution) can result in high or even full 
concentration of industries there if trade is free enough. The other location 
becomes hollowed out (left only with agriculture) as all capital migrates to the 
more productive location. This may explain why some developing countries 
are highly ambivalent to the globalisation process. However, that model also 
provides some comfort to developing countries. Greater trade liberalisation 
can attract low sunk-cost industries and capital to locate there even if their 
productivity distribution is characterised by higher risk. This can help kick- 
start the industrialisation process. The level of trade costs may also explain 
the large discrepancies in the amount of FDI emerging economies receive.
Finally, the third model captures the key stylised facts that have emerged in 
the recent wave of globalisation - namely the deindustrialisation of some devel­
oped economies (offshoring), their transition into services specialisation, and 
within nation wage inequality in both developed and developing economies. 
By explicitly modelling the evolution of industrial locations and the agglomer­
ation process driven by input-output linkages, the model provides predictions 
different from neoclassical theories. In particular, the model shows how glob­
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alisation can lead to the loss of manufacturing employment, stagnation or even 
decline of blue-collar wages in the developed countries.
In other words, globalisation is not always pareto improving. The fact 
that globalisation creates winners and losers, and the backlash it currently 
generates, underscores this point. Is the process of globalisation therefore as 
inevitable as the laws of gravity as Kofi Anan suggests? The era before the 
First World War was the last high point in globalisation. Feenstra (1998) 
in fact notes that if one uses merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP to 
be the proxy for globalisation, many industrialised countries today are only 
as globalised as on the eve of the First World War. What happened after 
the war - the Great Depression, the rise of competitive protectionism and 
economic nationalism - are well documented. The lessons of history inform 
us that globalisation is not necessarily an inevitable or irrevocable process. 
As Kofi Anan also notes, “Globalisation is a fact of life, but I believe we 
have underestimated its fragility.” How the process of globalisation should be 
managed to provide the greatest benefits for the greatest number of people, 
remains a keenly debated question.
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